Evaluating Consolidation and the Threat of Monopolies within Industrial Sectors by Hunter, Andrew P. et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Acquisition Research Program Acquisition Research Symposium
2018-08-30
Evaluating Consolidation and the Threat of
Monopolies within Industrial Sectors
Hunter, Andrew P.; Sanders, Gregory; Huitink, Zach
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/61862
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.







and the Threat of 
Monopolies within 
Industrial Sectors  
 
Authors 
Andrew P. Hunter 
Gregory Sanders  
Zach Huitink 
 















THIS PAGE LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK 
i 
Abstract:  
Economics scholars and policy makers have rung alarm bells about the 
increasing threat of consolidation and concentration within industrial sectors. This paper 
examines the importance of industrial concentration in two ways: first, a direct 
relationship between concentration and performance outcomes; and second, an indirect 
relationship, where concentration influences performance through reduced competition 
for defense acquisition. The study finds that consolidation correlates with lower rates of 
termination but has mixed associations with ceiling breaches. Contrary to hypothesis, 
competition is associated with higher rates of termination and that only single offer 
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In recent years, economists and policymakers have expressed heightened 
concern over industrial concentration and the potential for monopolies in a number of 
sectors of the U.S economy, ranging from retail trade and manufacturing to finance and 
utilities. These concerns extend to the U.S. defense industry, which the nation depends 
upon to equip its military with a wide array of mission-essential goods and services. 
Growing concentration may hinder competition, reduce the availability of key supplies 
and equipment, and diminish vendors’ incentives for innovation and performance in 
government contracts.  
To evaluate the urgency of these concerns, this study analyzes the relationship 
between concentration, competition, and performance outcomes in a large sample of 
U.S. federal contract transactions executed by the Department of Defense (DOD) 
between 2007 and 2016. Specifically, the study tests whether and to what extent 
growing concentration in different industries directly influences contract performance, as 
well as indirectly influences performance through reducing competition. For analysis 
purposes, study considers two types of contract performance markers: first, whether a 
contract breaches its initial cost ceiling, and second, whether it experiences a partial or 
complete termination. In this way, the study extends upon prior research by considering 
multiple dimensions of performance. It also contributes to prior research by analyzing 
the relationships between concentration, competition, and performance outcomes at the 
level of individual contracts rather than higher levels (e.g., programs) already given 
significant attention in previous studies.  
The study examines consolidation at two levels, 79 broad subsectors and 886 
detailed industries. Controlling for a variety of performance-related factors, including 
contract size, duration, pricing mechanism, purchasing organization, and select industry 
characteristics, the study finds that consolidation correlates with lower rates of 
termination but has mixed associations with ceiling breaches. Specifically, subsector 
concentration is associated with lower rates of ceiling breaches while detailed industry 
concentration is associated with higher rates of breaches. Contrary to hypothesis, 
xviii 
competition is associated with higher rates of termination and that only single offer 
competition is associated with lower rates of cost ceiling breaches. 
The results on concentration are in accord with the hypothesis that consolidation 
can result both in improved performance due to economies of scale but also challenges 
due to reduced contractor incentive to perform lest they be replaced. The association of 
single-offer competition with fewer ceiling breaches is consistent with competition 
incentivizing vendors to reduce cost while at the same time motivating some vendors to 
make aggressive bids that cannot be fulfilled. The decreased likelihood of terminations 
for competition is contrary to initial expectations but could be explained by vendor lock 
in which the government may not be as able to replace incumbent vendors due to a lack 
of alternatives.  
These results point to the need for government to carefully monitor costs when 
doing business with vendors in highly concentrated industries that have fewer 
competitors and pose a greater risk of vendor lock to incumbents. Furthermore, the 
government may benefit from understanding the risks of ceiling breaches and 
terminations for each contracting office and not just industrial sectors, as an unexpected 
finding was that differences between contracting agencies and office explain much of 
the variance in outcomes. Understanding the larger commercial market may also be of 
value, as the availability of such a market is correlated with lower termination rates in 
concentrated markets. The study also supports the idea that competition is not just a 
channel for industrial consolidation, but that it can be an independent variable in its own 
right, for better and worse. Further study of the mechanism of contracting may be 
rewarding, as the study team had not anticipated the interplay of numbers of offers and 
contracting outcomes.  Finally, the study team hopes the results will be of use to 





1.1 Project Motivation—Monopoly, Consolidation, and Implications for 
Performance 
In recent years, economists, policymakers, and other observers have 
expressed growing concerns over industrial concentration and the threat of 
monopolies in the U.S. economy.1 Data on revenue concentration, for example, 
show that the largest firms in a number of U.S. industries are accruing an increasing 
percentage of their respective industry’s market share. The 50-firm concentration 
ratio (CR50)—which measures the proportion of an industry’s revenue accruing to its 
50 largest firms—has grown by 10 percent or more over the last 15 years (1997-
2012, based on the latest available information) in industries ranging from 
transportation and warehousing to retail trade to finance and insurance.2 For 
example, in the case of finance and insurance, the latest available data (as of 2012) 
shows the 50 largest firms account for nearly half (48.5 percent) of all revenue in the 
industry. This figure is even higher elsewhere. In utilities, for instance, the CR50 
stands at 69.1 percent.3  
These trends may reflect an actual decline in competition, but it is important 
to note they could also stem from superior economic performance among firms that 
may have driven their competitors out of the market. Moreover, production in many 
industries (like utilities) is subject to at least some degree of economies of scale—
where per unit costs fall as production increases, and an industry’s total output can 
be produced more efficiently by fewer, rather than more, firms—making those 
industries more concentrated to begin with. Finally, while the data reflect what is 
happening nationally, the actual effects of concentration tend to play out on a lower 
                                                     
1 For a recent summary and synthesis of current views regarding industrial consolidation, monopoly, 
and their implications for policy, see Carl Shapiro, “Antitrust in a Time of Populism,” forthcoming, 
International Journal of Industrial Organization.    
2 White House Council of Economic Advisors, Benefits of Competition and Indicators of Market Power 
(Washington, DC:  White House CEA, 2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20160414_cea_competition_issue
_brief.pdf 
3 Ibid.  
2 
geographical scale (such that the issue is not strictly one of growing concentration 
nation-wide, but one that affects regional and local markets in particular). 
Acknowledging these caveats (and their implications for proper public policy 
response), the increasingly concentrated nature of many industries in the U.S. 
remains a noteworthy economic development.  
Concerns over industrial concentration and potential monopolies also extend 
to the U.S. defense industry. Maintaining a vibrant, dynamic defense industrial base 
with vendors that compete vigorously to win contracts and provide the government 
with products and services is critical to U.S. national security. Indeed, while 
historically the government has relied on mobilizing a mix of federally-funded 
arsenals and civilian contractors during wartime to meet its military needs, following 
WWII, these needs have been met principally by a permanent private defense 
establishment.  
This research project seeks to evaluate the urgency of these concerns by 
examining the connection between industrial concentration and contract outcomes. It 
examines the relationship in multiple ways. First, it examines the influence of 
concentration on the extent of competition. Second, directly, through the influence of 
concentration in the contract’s sector on performance. Third, indirectly, through the 
effects of competition on contract performance. Finally, both concentration and 
competition are incorporated into a single model for each performance metric. 
As the primary buyer of the defense industry’s goods and services, the U.S. 
government can play a significant role in shaping the industry’s size, composition, 
and economic viability. As a result, the defense industrial organization has evolved 
(at least in part) in accordance with military spending. Since WWII, the defense 
budget has cycled between a series of peaks and troughs, generating significant 
expansions in industrial capacity followed by more modest declines. This pattern 
resulted in a particularly acute case of capacity overhang following the end of the 
Cold War, because during the war contractors had invested heavily in plants, 
equipment, and other assets that were no longer needed following the war’s end 
(and the subsequent drop in defense expenditures). To eliminate inefficiencies 
3 
stemming from excess capacity, the Department of Defense (DOD) explicitly 
encouraged its contractors to merge and offered to share in savings generated from 
consolidations. Merger activity in the defense industry increased dramatically. 
Between 1993 and 2000, the number of major prime contractors fell from 50 to six.4 
However, it is still an open question whether and to what extent these mergers 
actually generated savings—or if the mergers even stemmed as much from the 
DOD’s pro-consolidation policy and post-Cold War budget cuts as they did from 
economy-wide trends that also drove mergers in non-defense industries.5 
Defense budgets reversed following 9/11 and grew at rapid double-digit rates 
for nearly a decade. However, spending reductions mandated by the Budget Control 
Act (BCA) of 2011 as well as the cuts to Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) 
funding around that time—policies collectively referred to as “the drawdown”— have 
significantly impacted the defense industry. Across individual product and service 
platforms, a recent analysis showed declines in defense contract obligations from 16 
percent for Ships and Submarines to as high as 56 percent for Land Vehicles.6 
Declines in other portfolios varied, according to the analysis, from 19 percent for 
Aircraft, to 20 percent for Ordinance and Missiles, to 32 percent for Space Systems.7 
Obligations for products, services, and R&D activities not falling under one of these 
specific platform categories fell by 30 percent, 28 percent, and 19 percent 
respectively.8 Within product, service, and R&D categories, the analysis showed that 
the shares of obligations going to small businesses tended to grow or remain steady, 
but the share of obligations tended to fall for the Big 5 (Lockheed Martin, Boeing, 
                                                     
4 Jacques Gansler, Democracy’s Arsenal:  Creating a Twenty-First Century Defense Industry 
(Cambridge, MA:  MIT Press, 2011).  
5 For a review of competing explanations of post-Cold War U.S. defense industry consolidation, see, 
e.g., Ryan R. Brady and Victoria A. Greenfield, “Competing Explanations of U.S. Defense Industry 
Consolidation in the 1990s and Their Policy Implications,” Contemporary Economic Policy 28, no. 2 
(2009).  
6 Rhys McCormack, Andrew P. Hunter, and Greg Sanders, Measuring the Impact of Sequestration 
and the Defense Drawdown on the Defense Industrial Base (Washington, DC:  CSIS, 2017). 
https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/publication/180111_McCormick_ImpactOfSequestration_Web.pdf?A10C65W9Qkx07VaJqYcJg




Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, and General Dynamics) and especially for large and 
medium size vendors.9 Across categories and vendor sizes, the analysis found that 
the number of vendors receiving prime contracts from the Department of Defense 
dropped in all by 17,000, or nearly 20 percent over the drawdown period.10  
Whether these vendors fully exited the defense marketplace or remained 
(e.g., as subcontractors) cannot be definitively established. Nonetheless, existing 
evidence suggests the U.S. defense industry is in the process of another significant 
episode of transformation, and officials from both the previous and current 
administrations have signaled worries over the industry’s health and 
competitiveness. As far back as 2011, Ash Carter, then Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD-AT&L, and later Secretary of 
Defense) stressed the importance of avoiding excessive consolidation among large 
prime contractors.11 His successor in the USD-AT&L role, Frank Kendall, took the 
same view, calling Lockheed Martin’s proposed and subsequently executed 
acquisition of rotary-wing aircraft manufacturer Sikorsky “the most significant change 
to the defense industry since the general consolidation that followed the Cold War.”12 
Kendall warned more generally that continued consolidation, particularly of large 
prime contractors, could diminish competition, limit the number of suppliers available 
to the military, erect barriers to entry, and hinder innovation that is key to sustaining 
U.S. technological superiority.13 Around the same time, the U.S. Department of 
Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) reiterated their commitment 
to take action against mergers that would dampen innovation and competitive forces 
and issued a joint statement saying, “many sectors of the defense industry are 
already highly concentrated [and others] appear to be on a similar trajectory.”14 More 
                                                     
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Marcus Weisberger, “Lockheed-Sikorsky Deal Stokes Fears About Industry Consolidation,” 
(Defense One, 2015), http://www.defenseone.com/business/2015/09/sikorsky-lockheed-deal-stokes-
fears-about-industry-consolidation/122445/  
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid.  
14 Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, “Joint Statement of the Department of 
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission on Preserving Competition in the Defense Industry.” 
(Washington, DC: 2016),  
 
5 
recently, under Executive Order 13806, President Trump directed a sweeping review 
of the industrial base with the aim of determining if its broad composition, capacity, 
and resiliency can meet a variety of potential supply chain threats.15 Questions of 
industrial concentration and monopoly power, as well as their implications for 
competition and performance, relate importantly to these issues.   
  
                                                                                                                                                                    
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/944493/160412doj-ftc-defense-
statement.pdf 
15 Executive Order 13806, “Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial 
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2 Literature Review 
2.1 Industrial Concentration – Definition and Measurement 
Industrial concentration refers to the degree to which a smaller versus a 
larger number of firms account for production or other measures of market share 
(e.g., revenue) in some part of the economy. 
Taking this idea as a point of departure, a large discourse in the literature has 
developed around alternative approaches to measuring concentration in practice.16 
One approach is to use concentration ratios, which add shares (whether of 
production, revenue, or some other activity) of a pre-determined number of firms in a 
particular market. Commonly used numbers include the top 4, 8, 20, or 50 firms in 
the market of interest. These ratios are relatively simple to calculate and, compared 
to other metrics—such as the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) —do not impose as 
large a challenge with data collection, because they do not require data on the 
shares of every firm in the relevant market place. By contrast, calculating the 
standard HHI requires data on the shares of every firm in the relevant market place 
and entails squaring each individual share before adding them (so as to weight the 
index more strongly toward larger companies). The upsides of this approach include 
counting shares of every applicable firm and weighting firms with larger shares more 
heavily in the calculation. Whereas concentration ratios are expressed in percentage 
terms (with a 100 percent maximum), the HHI varies between a minimum of 0 and a 
maximum of 10,000 (where one firm accounts for 100 percent of the market and 
1002 = 10,000). For purposes of evaluating mergers and their antitrust implications, 
the DOJ deems HH indices of 2,500 or higher to be significantly concentrated.17  
2.2 Causes of Industrial Concentration and Monopolies 
Variation in levels of industrial concentration—from very low to monopoly 
levels where one firm accounts for all of an industry’s production, revenue, sales, or 
                                                     
16 See, e.g., Lachlan B. Curry and K.D. George, “Industrial Concentration:  A Survey,” The Journal of 
Industrial Economics 31, no. 3 (1983) for commonly-cited review of the literature.  
17 See https://www.justice.gov/atr/herfindahl-hirschman-index 
8 
other economic activity— stems from several sources. Differences across industries 
or within a given industry over time may reflect an underlying decline in competition 
and attendant increases in market power for leading firms—a common interpretation 
of recent trends in the U.S.18—although one of at least four other forces may also be 
at play (and, depending on which, may suggest alternative explanations for changes 
in concentration levels). 
First, higher industrial concentration may stem from economies of scale, a 
technological feature of production that leads per unit production costs to fall as 
output rises. The upshot of this dynamic is that an industry’s aggregate output can 
be most efficiently produced by a smaller, rather than a larger, number of firms.19 
Accordingly, in a case like this, the industry actually operates most efficiently and 
can charge lower prices for its output with less—as opposed to more—firms in 
operation. The number of firms may fall due to some firms exiting the marketplace or 
through mergers and acquisitions. In extreme cases, economies of scale are so high 
as to make it most efficient for a single firm to produce all of an industry’s output, a 
situation referred to as a natural monopoly, which is common among utility 
companies. Unlike (as discussed below) situations where monopoly power derives 
from purposefully erected barriers to entry (e.g., government conferring operating 
privileges exclusively to a single company), natural monopolies arise due to the 
underlying technology for production of a good or service.20 Commonly-cited natural 
monopolies include utilities, where entry of additional firms would entail highly 
inefficient (and arguably infeasible) recreation of distribution infrastructure like pipes 
or power lines that one firm has already incurred the costs to build.21   
Second, and similarly, production may be subject to learning curves, where 
(however high or low scale economies may be) per unit costs fall as firms discover 
more efficient ways to produce output. According to learning curve theory, through 
repeated production, firms accumulate knowledge and experience that can be used 
                                                     
18 See supra note 1.  
19 Dennis W. Carleton and Jeffrey M. Perloff, Modern Industrial Organization (Pearson, 2015).  
20 For an early overview of natural monopoly, see Richard A. Posner, “Natural Monopoly and Its 
Regulation,” Stanford Law Review, no. 21 (1969),   
21 Rolf W. Kunneke, “Electricity networks:  how ‘natural’ is the monopoly?” Utilities Policy 8, (1999).  
9 
for purposes of process improvement, efficiency enhancements, and lower per-unit 
pricing22 (which may make them more competitive relative to their peers and lead 
them to capture higher market share). Manufacture of large capital assets like ships, 
planes, or construction equipment are often suggested to benefit from the learning 
curve dynamic, because while they may initially entail high costs for design and early 
unit production, they entail lower costs as production expands.   
Third, firms may create barriers to entry or force competitors out through 
strategic behavior like predatory pricing, hostile takeovers, or alternative forms of 
vertical acquisition where an incumbent firm acquires lower-level suppliers (thus 
eliminating potential sources of productive inputs that new entrants need in order to 
operate). Incumbent firms may act alone to create entry barriers, or they might 
potentially collude with one another for this purpose. A commonly cited example of 
collusion to prevent competition involves incumbent firms dividing up customers in 
lieu of vying with each other to capture as much business as possible. The firms 
may divide up sales territories, for example, and work together to prevent 
competitors from entering. Such conduct has been suspected or documented to 
have happened in industries as diverse as health insurance and chemicals.23     
Finally, in some instances governments purposefully erect structural barriers 
to entry that may limit competition that is otherwise likely to arise (e.g., in cases 
where scale economies do not operate at high levels and concentrate production in 
a few firms). Governments may create entry barriers through extending protections 
for intellectual property and innovation (e.g., through patents), through establishing 
legal and regulatory requirements that must be fulfilled in order to do business in a 
particular area, or by granting only one or a few firms permission to do a form of 
business (thereby foreclosing competitors from entering the market). Sufficiently 
high entry barriers can create monopolies in cases where the underlying technology 
of production implies strong efficiency gains from having one or only a few 
producers. Taxis are an often-cited example of a monopoly that city governments 
                                                     
22 See supra note 5.  
23 For further explanation and specific examples, see <https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-
guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/dealings-competitors/market-division-or>  
10 
have created through regulations such as requiring the purchase of a medallion to 
drive a cab.  
The monosopy nature of the market can also be a barrier. The defense 
industry sells its products principally to a single buyer: the U.S. government (from 
which decisions about policy, budgets, and procurement priorities can significantly 
impact defense industry structure). In addition, concentration in different sectors of 
the defense industry may stem at least partially from underlying scale economies, 
learning curve dynamics, and government-imposed regulations, which are often 
cited as a barrier to further entry by commercial firms. Scale economies and learning 
curves are fundamental to the production of large, complex assets such as fighter 
jets and ships, leading to high concentration in these sectors (U.S. aircraft carriers, 
for example, are built exclusively in one shipyard, operated by Newport News 
Shipbuilding). And, in both of these sectors (and all others from which government 
purchases products, services, and R&D support) rules and regulations that firms 
must adhere to for purposes of bidding on contracts and winning business may 
constitute a substantial barrier to further competition—particularly for non-traditional 
firms that could be significant sources of innovation. Experiments with alternative 
acquisition models and partnerships such as the Defense Innovation Unit – 
Experimental (DIUx)—the DoD’s Silicon Valley-based unit focused on identifying and 
acquiring cutting-edge commercial technology solutions for the U.S. military—are 
ongoing, but large-scale entry of commercial players into the defense marketplace 
(and attendant growth in competition) remains to be seen.     
2.3 Concentration, Competition, and Performance  
To the extent it stems from factors such as reductions in competition and 
barriers to entry (whatever their source), rather than economies of scale, learning 
effects, or other forces that reflect a firm’s active pursuit of ways to enhance 
efficiency, industrial concentration is concerning because it can reduce economic 
11 
welfare and generate market power that firms may use to extract rents in the form of 
higher prices to consumers.24  
Empirically, there is a large and now decades-old body of evidence relating 
increasing concentration to elevated prices and profits for firms.25 Whether these 
relationships reflect firms exercising market power to charge excessively high prices 
and make additional profits is less clear, however. Some research, for example, 
attributes the observed link between concentration and profits to efficiency gains 
stemming from learning and harnessing scale economies. These arguments suggest 
that efficiency-enhancing concentration generates reductions in both prices and 
costs, but greater reductions in the latter than the former (leading, on average, to 
higher observed profitability as price-cost differentials grow).26 This finding is 
supported by other research demonstrating that, after controlling for firm size, the 
relationship between concentration and profitability is less strong—suggesting profit 
growth comes from efficiencies brought about by increasing the scale of production, 
of which increased concentration is just a byproduct.27 More recent research comes 
to the opposite conclusion, finding robust connections between growing 
concentration, profits from both ongoing business as well as from mergers and 
acquisitions, and higher stock prices. Rather than reflecting operational efficiency 
and declining costs, however, this analysis suggests that higher profitability is a 
function of increased market power.28  
Compared to research on relationships between concentration, competition, 
and firm-performance outcomes like profitability, there has been less research 
conducted on the implications of concentration for other measures of performance. 
While, as noted, higher profitability from increasing concentration may reflect 
                                                     
24 See supra note 19.  
25 Literature reviews date back as far as the 1970s, with one review, published in 1974, cataloguing 
the results of 40 pre-existing studies. See Leonard Weiss, “The Concentration-Profits Relationship 
and Antitrust,” in Goldschmidt et al. (eds.), Industrial Concentration:  The New Learning, (New York, 
NY:  1974).  
26 Sam Peltzman, “The Gains and Losses from Industrial Concentration,” Journal of Law and 
Economics 20, (1977).  
27 See Yale Brozen, Concentration, Mergers, and Public Policy, (New York: Macmillan, 1982).  
28 Gustavo Grullon, Yelena Larkin and Roni Michaely, “Are US Industries Becoming More 
Concentrated?,” Working Paper (2017).  
12 
stronger operational efficiency, there are other possible sources that do not imply 
better performance. As a result, this still leaves open the problem of explicitly 
examining links between concentration and firm performance along non-financial 
dimensions.  
Moreover, compared to research on the private sector, very little work has 
been done to examine the implications of industrial concentration for government, 
specifically in the context of procurement and contracting. Competition is deemed a 
fundamental source of value in public procurement and is argued to provide higher 
quality products at lower prices, along with ancillary benefits such as accountability, 
fraud prevention, and better stewardship of taxpayer resources.29 In buying simple 
goods and services, for which many suppliers already exist, the benefits of 
competition can be powerful. For more complex products—whether inputs into 
government’s provision of public services (e.g., fighter jets for national defense) or 
public services delivered by non-governmental actors (e.g., social services provided 
by a nonprofit organization)—markets may be thinner and competition less viable.30 
However, in these cases too, the focus has been on examining the relationships 
between the quality of products and services on the one hand and competition on 
the other. Moreover, this work has often been done in the context of one or a few 
different product types.  
Research that independently (or through competition as a mediating channel) 
explores the link between program level outcomes and concentration, competition, 
and contractor performance appears to be mostly absent from the existing literature 
and would add be considerable value. In particular, there’s an absence of work that 
uses large amounts of data to look across numerous product and service categories. 
There appear to be very few example studies explicitly assessing the link between 
industrial concentration and performance outcomes in the U.S. defense arena. One 
example is an analysis finding a positive relationship between concentration and firm 
                                                     
29 Kate Manuel, Competition in Federal Contracting: An Overview of the Legal Requirements. 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011). 
30 Donald Kettl, Sharing Power: Public Governance and Private Markets. (Washington, DC: The 
Brookings Institution, 1993). 
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profitability in the aerospace industry. 31 Another analysis, more closely related to the 
research presented in this paper, finds evidence that some defense industry 
mergers generated cost savings in Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) 
but also found that mergers do not categorically generate program-level savings.32 
Unlike the present study, however, this analysis is focused on financial dimensions 
of performance at the program level. This study extends the literature by looking at 
both financial and non-financial dimensions of performance and considers outcomes 
at the contract, rather than the program, level.   
  
                                                     
31 Judy B. Davis, The Impact of the Defense Industry Consolidation on the Aerospace Industry, 
(Washington, DC:  Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 2006).  
32 Russel V. Hoff, Analysis of Defense Industry Consolidation Effects on Program Acquisition Costs, 
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3 Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses 
This paper posits and tests a conceptual argument linking industrial 
concentration and contract performance in two ways: first, a direct relationship 
between concentration and performance outcomes; and second, an indirect 
relationship, where concentration influences performance through reducing 
competition for government contract awards and task orders. Specified in this 
manner, the argument broadens the approach to observing the relationship between 
concentration and contract performance, accounting for multiple ways that the two 
variables may be connected.  
3.1 Industrial Concentration and Contract Performance – Direct 
Relationship 
The most straightforward way that industrial concentration impacts different 
markers of contract performance is through a direct relationship between the two 
variables. That is, changes in the level of industrial concentration are associated with 
an observable variation in alternative performance benchmarks, including (as 
considered in this paper) terminations and breaches of cost ceilings.  
While arguments about concentration and contract performance may suggest 
the two are negatively related—with higher concentration leading to poorer 
performance—these arguments usually imply the presence of a mediating variable. 
Competition, as discussed in section 3.2, is one such variable. Economies of scale is 
another, which is often cited when arguing that concentration and performance may 
instead be positively related. In this case, rather than decreasing competition (and 
the attendant accumulation of market power a vendor may wield over the 
government), increasing concentration leads to positive performance, as it reflects 
efficiency gains from one or more vendors consolidating to operate at a larger scale 
of production.  
Arguments that do not imply or explicitly reference a mediating variable—but 
instead posit a direct concentration-performance link—are agnostic with respect to 
whether growing concentration levels foster better or worse performance. Therefore, 
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for hypothesis testing purposes, the study team does not suggest the direct 
relationship between concentration and contract performance is positive or negative. 
Instead, we simply hypothesize that the former may have a direct influence on the 
latter: 
 H1: industrial concentration leads to changes in contract performance  
 
3.2 Industrial Concentration and Contract Performance – Mediating 
Role of Competition  
While concentration and contract performance may be directly related, one 
common argument is that higher concentration negatively impacts performance by 
hindering competition that would otherwise act to discipline incumbent vendors. All 
else equal, greater competition gives the government greater control in their 
relationship with vendors, providing them with multiple options while forcing vendors 
to perform well, because they are considered more replaceable. 
Through reducing the number of vendors from which government can select 
for awarding a contract, the argument is that concentration effectively reduces 
competitive forces. In addition, this would reduce the incumbent vendor’s incentive 
to perform effectively, as the prospect of being replaced is now lower. The 
incumbent may therefore be less motivated to innovate, control costs, or otherwise 
ensure its product meets or exceeds the government’s requirements. Consequently, 
the risk of termination or a cost ceiling breach may be elevated.  
This line of reasoning points to two hypotheses. First, the logic that industrial 
concentration’s influence on performance through a competition channel implies a 
relationship between concentration and competition per se. Put simply, as 
concentration increases, competition decreases. Second, it implies a link between 
competition and performance outcomes, where reduced competition makes poorer 
performance more likely. In other words: 
 
 H2: Increasing (decreasing) industrial concentration leads to decreasing 
(increasing)  competition  
 
 H3: Decreasing (increasing) competition makes poor contract performance 
more (less) likely  
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4 Data and Methods 
4.1 Data Sources and Structure 
4.1.1 Data Sources 
The study team’s primary source of data for this study is the Federal 
Procurement Data System (FPDS), which tracks all prime federal contract 
transactions worth $3,500 or more, conducted by most U.S. government department 
and agencies.33 CSIS has created its own copy of this database, using data 
downloaded from USAspending.gov and supplemented at times with the FPDS-NG 
ad hoc search webtool. The study team supplemented this dataset with economics 
statistics broken down by NAICS category, as report by the U.S. Census and Bureau 
of Labor Statistics. During the period of this study, the USA spending website 
underwent a major update that CSIS is still incorporating into the study team’s 
analysis.  
4.1.2 Data Structure     
The unit of analysis for the dataset is prime contracts award and task orders. 
Each contract entry has a unique procurement identifier, and each task order entry 
has a unique combination of a parent award identifier and procurement identifier. 
The dataset includes all completed DoD contracts and task orders initiated between 
fiscal years 2008 and 2016 that were completed by the end fiscal year 2016.34 For 
task orders, the dates of inclusion and completion are based on each specific task 
order, not the date of the larger parent. The data set contains over 11.8 million 
entries, of which 30.0 percent were removed due to missing data, primarily with 
reference to undefinitized contract awards. These removed entries accounted for 
about 18.7 percent of obligations in the original dataset. For computational efficiency 
                                                     
33 Prominent exceptions include classified contracts, which excludes the entirety of the CIA and some 
DoD contracts, most prominently in the U.S. Air Force. Other parts of the government are not 
required to report, such as the Defense Commissary Agency or the U.S. Postal Service. A larger 
dataset, including 2006 and 2007 values when available, was used to rescale the centered and 
logged variables. 
34 Completion is measured by having surpassed the current completion date of the contract or task 
order by at least one year or by contract close out or a partial or complete contract termination. 
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purposes, the study team has limited the analysis to a random sample of just 
250,000 contracts and task orders from the filtered dataset. For simplicity’s sake, 
when this paper refers to contracts it includes both awards and task orders. In those 
cases where only awards or task orders are being referred to, the more specific term 
will be used. 
The study team has created the contract dataset from FPDS, which expands 
and updates a dataset used in previous CSIS reports on Fixed-Price35 and Crisis 
contracting. 36 To create this dataset, the study team decided how to handle 
contradictory information within the same field and how to consolidate large numbers 
of categories in the raw data into more manageable number used in the regression. 
To mitigate contradictions and to emphasize information available at the time a 
contract is awarded, as a general principle, the most weight is given to a contract or 
task orders’ initial unmodified transaction. The primary addition to the datasets used 
in previous reports relates to the North American Industrial Classification System 
(NAICS). First, the study team calculated the top detailed industry (NAICS 6-digit 
code) for each contract in the dataset. Second, the study team added a measure for 
industrial concentration, which was calculated at the NAICS subsector (NAICS 3-
digit code) and detailed industry level.37  
In addition to the contract dataset, the measures of concentration also relied 
on past and updated work by the study team to consolidate large vendors who may 
be represented by multiple DUNS numbers (the primary unique identifier for vendors 
within FPDS). The study team uses an obligation-weighted approach to choose 
identifiers for manual classification that have received either more than $1 billion in 
                                                     
35 Andrew Hunter et al., “Avoiding Terminations, Single-Offer Competition, and Costly Changes with 
Fixed-Price Contracts,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2015, https://csis-
prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/legacy_files/files/publication/151216_Sanders_FixedPriceContracts_Web.pdf. 
36 Greg Sanders and Andrew Hunter, “Overseas Contingency Operations Contracts After Iraq: 
Enabling Financial Management Research and Transparency Through Contract Labeling,” Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2017, 
https://www.researchsymposium.com/conf/app/researchsymposium/unsecured/file/145/SYM-AM-17-
051-005_Sanders.pdf. 
37 CSIS has made this dataset publicly available through our github repository 
(https://github.com/CSISdefense/Vendor/) to other researchers to be used with attribution. 
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obligations from 2000 to 2017 or $250 million in any year in constant 2017 dollars. 
Those identifiers which the study team has not manually classified are instead 
handled via parent codes that are provided by the database. One disadvantage to 
this approach is that merger and acquisition activity is sometimes backdated to 
years before the merger occurred. However, the value weighted approach applied 
by the study team is appropriate for the industrial concentration measures described 
in the literature review, because the largest firms in a sector are disproportionately 
important to calculating the HHI. 
4.2 Measures of Dependent and Independent Variables 
This section introduces the variables used in our regression model. For 
consistency and ease of data replication, the shortened name of the variable is 
included in parentheses after the full name. This shorthand name is also used in the 
definition of the equation and the results.38 
4.2.1 Dependent Variables 
Rescaled Logged Number of Offers (cl_Offr) is the number of offers each 
contract received, logged and then rescaled. Sole source awards are treated as 
receiving a single offer, consistent with how they are classified within FPDS. The 
study team considered multiple variables to competition: whether or not a contract 
used competitive procedures, whether or not a contract was competed with multiple 
offers, and the number of offers received. The study team decided to use number of 
offers received because it offers the detail of a continuous measure and because it 
is straightforwardly compatible with regression modeling in a way that binned 
numbers of offers would not be. The study team took the logarithm of this measure 
because that transformation puts the same weight on the difference between 1 and 
2 offers as the difference between 5 and 10. 
                                                     
38 Some of the variables were transformed from categorical variables to the mathematical formats 
used in the dataset, for example Term has a value of “Terminated” or “Not Terminated” while b_Term 
has a value of 0 or 1. Different prefixes are used depending on data type “b_” refers to binary 
variables, “n_” refers to numerical variables, “l_” refers to variables that have undergone a logarithmic 
transformation, and “c_” labels to variables that were rescaled which includes centering (and thus 
“cl_” is a rescaled logarithmically transformed variable. 
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The log of the number of offers is rescaled, by subtracting its mean (1.12) and 
dividing by its standard deviation doubled (2.22). The standard deviation is larger 
than expected, with a small number of high offer contracts exerting a big effect. 
Values of -0.5, 0, 0.5 correspond to 1, 3.1, and 9.3, offers respectively. Offers data is 
missing for less than 2 percent of records. 
Partial or Complete Terminations (b_Term) measures whether contracts 
experience a partial or complete termination, which yields a value of 1, while 
contracts with no terminations are given the value 0 for this variable. FPDS does not 
differentiate between complete and partial terminations, so this can include both a 
cancelled program and a contract that was completed after being initially protested 
and reassigned. 1.2 percent of contracts have experienced at least one partial or 
complete termination, and those records account for about 5.6 percent of obligations 
in the dataset. 
Ceiling Breaches (b_CRai) tracks whether the contract had to be changed in 
a means that risked significant cost increases. To measure this, the study team 
observed transactions that are contract change orders and considered a ceiling 
breach to have occurred (assigning a value of 1) if any of these modifications also 
increased the contract or task order’s cost ceiling. Otherwise, the team assigned a 
value of 0. While only 1.2 percent of contracts have experienced a ceiling breach, 
the total obligations of those entries account for over 21 percent of obligations in the 
dataset. In addition, a slim fraction of terminations overlaps with ceiling breaches, 
despite both accounting for a similar percentage of contracts and task orders. 
4.2.2 Study Independent Variables 
Study Variables 
Competition (CompOffr) is a dummy variable with five values based on 
whether a contract was competed and, if so, with how many offers received.: 
 No Competition includes all sole-source contracts, with single-award 
vehicles classified based on vehicle level competition and not for the 
individual task order. This is the baseline variable and does not receive its 
own dummy. 
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 1 offer (nearly 14 percent of contracts and 12 percent of obligations). 
 2 offers (19 percent of contracts and 12 percent of obligations). 
 3-4 offers (21 percent of contracts and 15 percent of obligations).      
 5+ offers (approaching 29 percent of contracts and 25 percent of 
obligations). 
The study team draws on multiple variables in FPDS to make this 
determination, with some contracts relying on the extent of the competitive field and 
others relying on the fair opportunity field. The study team used other variations on 
the measure for competition for earlier versions of this paper, , including the coding 
competition into three numerical categories for sole source, single offer, and 
‘effective competition,’ i.e. competition with two or more offers, which  is used by the 
DoD when monitoring their own competition rates.39  However, after the 
incorporation of the complete multilevel model, this variable proved not to be a 
significant predictor and the study team increased the granularity to better 
understand competitive dynamics. Competition is missing from 1.9 percent of 
contracts and a bit over 1.7 percent of obligated dollars in the dataset. 
                                                     




Figure 1.  Concentration in Selected Defense-Detailed Industry Categories 
Subsector and Detailed Industry Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(cl_def3_HHI_lag1 and cl_def6_HHI_lag1 respectively) are a measure of 
industrial concentration in the defense industrial base. As described in the literature 
review, the HHI is calculated by squaring the market share of each participant in a 
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sector. The study team faces two common challenges in creating this variable: 
identifying and collecting reliable data on market shares and, more fundamentally, 
defining the scope of the marketplace in which concentration will be analyzed. The 
study team began with the detailed industry, the six-digit NAICS code and the most 
detailed level available. After adding economic statistics to the model, the study 
team decided to include the subsector HHI, the three-digit NAICS code, as well. 
Figure 1 shows eight of the top sectors, selected for having either the most 
contracts or the most obligations over the study period with the HHI shown before 
logging. The dotted lines are the lower and upper bounds of what the DOJ considers 
to be a moderately consolidated market. The date range is 2006 to 2015 because 
subsector and detailed industry HHI are lagged one year. So, for a contract signed in 
2009, the concentration measure of industry in 2008 is used.  
All else equal, defining a sector more broadly—and thereby including more 
firms—will tend to reduce concentration levels, whereas a more precise definition 
will raise them. One downside to this approach is that less-used NAICS codes are 
reported as highly consolidated because they are used by so few vendors. The 
advantage of this approach is evaluating the implications of concentration for 
competition, consumer welfare, and public policy often requires examining trends at 
a less aggregated level.  
For the purposes of this study, market share refers to the percentage of prime 
obligations within a given fiscal year, which has the notable drawback of not 
capturing subcontracting activity. In the dataset, this measure is lagged by one year. 
Both measures are separately logged and rescaled. 40  
 The logged detailed industry HHI is rescaled, by subtracting its mean (7.1
4) and dividing by its standard deviation doubled (1.09). Values of -1, 0, 0.
5, and 1 correspond to 142, 1,266, 3,780, and 11,293 HHI score respectiv
ely, with the later value exceeding the upper end of the scale 
                                                     
40 Centering a variable is a way of making sure the different variables in a regression model are 
operating on the same scale, which makes it easier to compare coefficients across different variables. 
Mathematically to center x means c_x = (x –average of x) / (standard deviation of x). 
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 Logged subsector HHI has a notably lower mean and standard deviation. 
That variable is using the same formula of subtracting its mean (6.24) and 
dividing by its standard deviation doubled (0.951). Values of -1, 0, 0.5, and 
1 correspond to 76, 512, 1,326, and 3,430 HHI score respectively. 
Missing data can be a challenge for both variables for reasoned discussed in 
section 6.4.5. For the subsector and detailed industry HHI, data is missing for about 
0.1 and 2.8 percent of records, respectively, and 0.25 and 3.6 percent of obligated 
dollars, respectively. 
4.2.3 Other Sector-Level Variables 
Contract Industrial Sector 
NAICS represents the top North American Industrial Classification Code of 
each contract and is measured by obligated amount. This paper uses a multilevel 
model that allows for setting a different intercept for detailed each industrial sector, 
which is discussed in greater detail in the next section (4.3).  
As shown in Figure 2, the distribution of DoD contract obligations is focused 
in a subset of the 24 NAICS 2-digit codes. Manufacturing (31-33) in particular is the 
top category in dollar and count terms and stands out because that category—like 
Transportation and Warehousing (48-49) as well as Retail Trade (44-45)—spills over 
into multiple 2-digit codes. In dollar terms, Professional, Scientific, and Technical 
Services (54) and Construction (23) are the second and third most prevalent 
industrial sectors; however, they are less significant in terms of the number of 
contracts because those sectors have higher value contracts. At the other end of the 
scale, Wholesale Trade (42) has lower obligations contracts, with less dollars 






Figure 2.  Distribution of Contract Obligations by NAICS 2-Digit Code 
Detailed Industry Defense Obligations (cl_def6_obl_lag1) 
This variable annually sums total defense obligations by NAICS subsector 
and detailed industry. It’s included in the model with a lag of one year, so the 
estimator for any contract will be the total obligations in the prior calendar year. It is 
also calculated at the subsector level, but that variable does not appear directly in 
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the models but is instead used to help create the subsector ratio. For both variations, 
when the total is negative or zero, it is treated as a missing value 
For the detailed industry values are logged and rescales. This involves 
subtracting the mean of 20.2 and then dividing by the standard deviation doubled 
(3.85). Rescaled Values of -1, 0, and 1 correspond to 1.2 million, 58 million, 2.7 
billion in current dollar annual obligations. Data is missing for 2.8 percent of records 
and 3.6 percent of obligations. See section 6.4.5 for a discussion of why the missing 
data for NAICS categories. 
Subsector Ratio and Detailed Industry Ratio (cl_def6_ratio_lag1 and 
cl_def6_ratio_lag1) compares total defense obligations to revenues in the same 
NAICS category for the U.S. economy as a whole. The study team learned of this 
approach and of the necessary sources through the work Nancy Young Moore, 
Clifford A. Grammich, and Judith D. Mele.41 The revenue data is only available for 
2007 and 2012. Contracts starting in calendar years 2008-2012 use the 2007 value 
and contracts starting between 2013 and 2015 use the 2012 value. Because 
obligation and revenue are two different measures, it is possible for the defense 
obligations to exceed revenue in the U.S. economy as a whole. In that case, the 
study team capped the variable at 1, which represents complete monosopy by the 
DoD. 
However, for most NAICS categories, defense obligations are only a small 
proportion of the total economy which can be seen in the logged and rescaled 
variables.  
 The subsector ratio variable is rescaled, by subtracting its mean (-4.99) and 
dividing by its standard deviation doubled (3.45). Values of -1, 0, and 1 
correspond to a defense to civilian ratio of 0.00021, 0.0068, and 0.21 
respectively. 
 The detailed industry ratios tend to be higher, their subtracted mean is only -
4.52 and their doubled standard deviation is larger as well at 69. In the 
                                                     
41 Nancy Young Moore, Clifford A. Grammich, and Judith D. Mele, “Trends in the DoD Industrial 




resulting rescaled variable, Values of -1, 0, and 1 correspond to defense to 
civilian ratios of 0.00027, 0.011, and 0.44 respectively." 
The subsector and detailed industry ratio are unavailable for about 0.2 and 
2.9 percent of records, respectively, and 0.29 and 3.6 percent of obligated dollars, 
respectively. 
Subsector and Detailed Industry U.S. Average Salary 
(cl_US6_avg_sal_lag1) is a variable calculated by dividing the payroll of the relevant 
detailed industry by the number of employees. For this dataset it is derived from the 
economic census, and thus only available in 2007 and 2012 as with the ratio 
variables. As with the other economic variables it is logged and rescaled. Rescaling 
subtracts its mean (11) and dividing by its standard deviation doubled (0.798). The 
resulting variable covers a wide gamut of wages with -1, 0, and 1 corresponding to 
$26,997, $59,964, and $133,186 dollars respectively. Data is missing for 2.9 percent 
of contracts and 3.6 percent of obligations. 
4.2.4 Other Contract-Level Inputs 
Initial Contract Scope 
Initial Cost Ceiling (cl_Ceil) is the natural log of the initial contract cost 
ceiling as reported by the base and all options field, in then-year dollars.42 The 
variable is rescaled by subtracting its mean (8.22)  and dividing by its standard 
deviation doubled (5.22). Values of -1, 0, 0.5, and 1 correspond to $20, $3,723, 
$50,714, and $690,812 respectively. Data is missing for just over 0.04 percent of 
contracts and transactions, which accounts for just under 0.15 percent of obligated 
dollars in the dataset.  
Initial Duration (cl_Days) is the natural log of the initial maximum duration of 
the contract in days. The maximum duration is determined by comparing the 
contract’s effective date to the current completion date. The variable is rescaled by 
                                                     
42 Constant dollars are not to allow for comparability between the contract ceiling and contract’s 
actual expenditures in multiyear contracts. The base and all options ceiling of the contract is in 
nominal dollars but does not break out the cost ceiling for each individual year of a contract’s life. As 
a result, the ceiling in constant dollars could be approximated, for example by assuming that the 
ceiling will be split evenly over the life of a contract, but cannot be calculated with any certainty. 
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subtracting its mean (2.83) and dividing by its standard deviation doubled (3.73). 
Values of -0.5, 0, 0.5, and 1 correspond to 2.6 days, 17 days, 110 days, and 716 
days respectively. Data is missing for under 0.4 percent of contracts and 
transactions, which represents about 0.57 percent of dataset obligations. 
Contract Vehicle 
Contracts come in a variety of types, some of which are simple purchase 
orders, others are complex but single use contract awards, and yet others are task 
orders that are specific instances of an overarching indirect delivery vehicle. These 
types are explained below and help define the nature of the contractor/customer 
relationship.43 The dataset uses dummy variables for four different types of indirect 
delivery vehicles: 
 SIDC is 1 if the vehicle is a single-award indefinite delivery contract and 0 
otherwise. These contracts may be initially awarded via competition but 
afterwards are only used for task orders to a single vendor. They 
constitute over 64.5 percent of all contracts.  
 MIDC is 1 if the vehicle is a multiple-award indefinite delivery contract and 
0 otherwise. These vehicles have a pool of potential vendors that can 
receive task orders, and they make up almost 2.7 percent of contracts and 
task orders. 
 FSSGWAC is 1 if the vehicle is a Federal Supply Schedule or 
Government-Wide Acquisition Contract and 0 otherwise. These two 
consistently multiple-award indirect delivery vehicles constitute 3.8 percent 
of task orders and contracts.  
 BPABOA is 1 if the vehicle is a Blank Purchase Agreement or Basic 
Ordering Agreement and 0 otherwise. These indirect vehicles can be 
either single-award or multi-award, but taken together they only constitute 
1.9 percent of task orders and contracts.  
The remaining 27 percent of contracts are contract awards and purchase 
orders with no parent contract. This is the baseline for the regression model, which 
is true when all four dummy variables are zero. Vehicle classifications are missing 
for less than 0.1 percent of contracts and for a similarly small percentage of dataset 
obligations. 
                                                     
43 For more detail on contract vehicle types, see the Glossary at USAspending.gov. 
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Contract Pricing 
Fixed-Price (PricingFee) is a categorical variable based on contract pricing 
and fee structure. The baseline is firm-fixed price contracts, which account for 82 
percent of all contracts. 
 Other FP refers to other fixed-price consists of includes fixe-price 
redetermination, fixed-price award fee, and fixed-price economic price 
adjustment and accounts for almost 15 percent of contracts. 
 Incentive refers to the incentive fee contracts, including fixed-price 
incentive fee, cost plus incentive fee, and cost sharing. It accounts for only 
0.2 percent of contracts. 
 Combination or Other covers contracts using multiple pricing 
mechanisms or unusual and unclassified types. It accounts for 0.4 percent 
of contracts. 
 Other CB refers to all types of cost-based contracting, excluding incentive 
fee and accounts for just over 1 percent of contracts. 
 T&M/LH/FPLOE refers to time and materials, labor hors, and fixed-price 
level of effort contracts respectively. It accounts for just over 0.8 percent of 
contracts. 
A miniscule percentage of contracts and obligations are unlabeled.  
Undefinitized Contract Action (b_UCA) is a binary variable with a value of 1 
for contracts that begin as letter contracts or undefinitized contract awards (UCA) 
and a value of 0 otherwise. They account for a tiny proportion (about than 0.03 
percent) of contracts and only 3.7 percent of obligations, but they do significantly 
correlate with a greater risk of terminations and ceiling breaches. Unfortunately, due 
to a reporting error in recent years on the now retired version of USAspending.gov, 
UCA classification is missing for nearly 26 percent of records and over 10 percent of 
obligations in the dataset. Nonetheless, the predictive power of this variable is 
sufficient therefore still included in the study. 
Contract Location 
Any International (b_Intl) is a binary variable with a value of 1 for contracts 
with any transactions performed internationally and a value of 0 otherwise. 7.6 
percent of contracts had an international component as well as nearly 14.5 percent 
of obligations. Only a miniscule portion of records were unlabeled.  
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4.3 Empirical Approach 
The study team has created one model evaluating the connection between 
industrial consolidation and competition, four models evaluating all combinations of 
the study and mediating variables (competition and concentration respectively) with 
the two contract outcome variables (terminations and ceiling breaches), and finally 
another two models combining the study and mediating variables for each outcome 
variable. The initial model allowed the study team to study H2. The combined model 
for industrial consolidation and competition were used to evaluate H1 and H3 
respectively. The middle four model proved less necessary than expected, because 
neither the coefficients for industrial concentration nor competition notably changes 
upon the inclusion of the other. 
4.3.1 Choice of Econometric Model 
For the initial model of industrial consolidation’s correlation with competition, 
the study team used a regression analysis with the outcome variable of the log of 
number of offers. For this model sole source awards were treaded as having a single 
offer. The study team used a maximum likelihood logit analysis to analyze both 
termination and ceiling breaches. Logit is suited to dependent variables which can 
be true or false, 1 or 0, but not values outside of that range. This approach does not 
allow for evaluation of the size of a ceiling breach or variations of partial or complete 
terminations. However, less than 5 percent of contracts or task orders ever 
experience ceiling breaches or termination, therefore the study team is only focusing 
on when these events occur and not differences between these cases.  
In addition, for each of these models, the study team employs multilevel 
modeling techniques to capture the differences in expected outcomes between 
industrial sectors as categorized by NAICS codes and contracting office. Each 
contract is assigned to a detailed industry NAICS sector based on the NAICS code 
that received the most overall obligations over the contract’s lifespan. Similarly, each 
contract is assigned a contracting office and agency based on the initial transaction 
for the contract. Finally, for the initial model of industrial consolidation’s correlation 
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with competition, the initial contract signed date is used to determine the starting 
calendar year. This results in five groupings: 
 Subsector Code with 79 groups within the sample. 
 Detailed Industry Code, nested underneath subsector codes with 886 
groups within the sample 
 Contracting Agency Code with 24 groups within the sample. 
 Contracting Office Code, nested underneath the agency codes, with 1,296 
groups within the sample. 
 Start Calendar Year, with 9 groups from 2008 to 2016. 
The equations below use a varying intercept model, which is to say that each 
of the groupings has a constant term added to the equation based on the termination 
or ceiling breach rate within that sector. Multilevel modeling techniques are a means 
to balance between two extremes when considering how to combine data from 
different groups. The first technique is complete pooling, which means there would 
be no varying intercept and no differentiation based on a contract’s NAICS sector. 
The second technique is no pooling, which means there is a separate model for 
each NAICS sector. Multilevel modeling uses “soft constraints,” which are covered in 
more detail in the next section. The study team employed a mix modeling techniques 
recommended by Andrew Gelman and Jennifer Hill44 and Nicolas Sommet and 
Davide Morselli.45 
4.3.2 Presentation of Estimating Equation  
For competition as a mediating variable when estimating the probability of 
termination, the study team used the following model (subscript 𝑖 refers to the 
individual contract or task order, while subscript 𝑗 refers to the NAICS subsector, 
subscript k refers to NAICS detailed industry, subscript l refers to contracting 
                                                     
44 Andrew Gelman and Jennifer Hill, Data Analysis Using Regression and Multilevel/Hierarchical 
Models (New York, NY:  Cambridge University Press, 2007). The adoption of these method did not 
extend to the use of BUGS, an alternative to the LME4 modeler. 
45 Sommet, Nicolas. and Davide Morselli,  “Keep Calm and Learn Multilevel Logistic Modeling: A 
Simplified Three-Step Procedure Using Stata, R, Mplus, and SPSS” International Review of Social 
Psychology: 30(1), (2017), 203-218, DOI: http://doi.org/10.5334/irsp.90 
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agency, subscript m refers to contracting office, and subscript n refers to calendar 
year for those equations that include it): 
Equation 1 Industrial Concentration and Competition 
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑑 (𝐿𝑜𝑔 ( 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠))𝑖







+  𝛽2𝑐𝑙_𝑑𝑒𝑓6_𝐻𝐻𝐼_𝑙𝑎𝑔1𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑂𝑓𝑓1 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑂𝑓𝑓2 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑂𝑓𝑓3-4𝑖
+  𝛽6𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑂𝑓𝑓5𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑐𝑙_𝑑𝑒𝑓3_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜_𝑙𝑎𝑔1𝑖 +  𝛽8𝑐𝑙_𝑑𝑒𝑓6_𝑜𝑏𝑙_𝑙𝑎𝑔1𝑖 
+  𝛽9𝑐𝑙_𝑑𝑒𝑓6_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜_𝑙𝑎𝑔1𝑖 +  𝛽10𝑐𝑙_𝑈𝑆6_𝑎𝑣𝑔_𝑠𝑎𝑙_𝑙𝑎𝑔1𝑖 + 𝛽11𝑐𝑙_𝐶𝑒𝑖𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽12𝑐𝑙_𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽13𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑉𝑖
+ 𝛽14𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑉𝑖 + 𝛽15𝐹𝑆𝑆-𝐺𝑊𝐴𝐶𝑖
+  𝛽16𝐵𝑃𝐴-BOA𝑖 + 
𝛽17𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟_𝐹𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽18𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽19𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏-𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽20𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟_𝐶𝐵𝑖  + 𝛽20𝑇𝑀-LH-FPLOE𝑖 + 𝛽20𝑏_𝑈𝐶𝐴𝑖  + 𝛽20𝑏_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑙𝑖
+  𝛽21𝑐𝑙_𝑑𝑒𝑓6_𝐻𝐻𝐼_𝑙𝑎𝑔1𝑖 ∙ 𝑏_𝑈𝐶𝐴𝑖 +  𝛽22𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑉𝑖 ∙ 𝑏_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽23𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑉𝑖 ∙ 𝑏_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑙𝑖 +  𝛽24𝐹𝑆𝑆-𝐺𝑊𝐴𝐶𝑖 
∙ 𝑏_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽25𝐵𝑃𝐴-BOA𝑖 ∙ 𝑏_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑙𝑖 +𝛽26𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟_𝐹𝑃𝑖  ∙ 𝑏_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑙 𝑖 +  𝛽27𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖
∙ 𝑏_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑙 𝑖 + 𝛽28𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏-𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖 ∙ 𝑏_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑙 𝑖 +  𝛽29𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟_𝐶𝐵𝑖 ∙ 𝑏_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑙 𝑖 +  𝛽30𝑇𝑀-LH-FPLOE𝑖 ∙ 𝑏_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑙 𝑖
+ 𝜖𝑖,          𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 1 𝑡𝑜 249,855 
𝛼𝑗
𝑁𝐴𝐼𝐶𝑆3~𝑁(𝜇𝛼,, 𝜎𝑎
2), 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗 = 1 𝑡𝑜 79 
𝛼𝑘
𝑁𝐴𝐼𝐶𝑆6~𝑁(𝜇𝛼,, 𝜎𝑎








2), 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑚 = 1 𝑡𝑜 1,296 
𝛼𝑛
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟~𝑁(𝜇𝛼,, 𝜎𝑎
2), 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑛 = 1 𝑡𝑜 9 
 
The second half of the equation merits additional explanation. 𝛼𝑗
𝑁𝐴𝐼𝐶𝑆3 and 
𝛼𝑘
𝑁𝐴𝐼𝐶𝑆6 refers to the subsector and detailed industry intercepts, which in this and the 





 , and 𝛼𝑛
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 likewise represent their respective 
groupings. Andrew Gelman and Jennifer Hill explain the concept in their introductory 
text book. 
“In the multilevel model, a “soft constraint” is applied to the [𝛼𝑗
𝑁𝐴𝐼𝐶𝑆3]’s : 
they are assigned a probability distribution [see above], with their mean 
𝜇𝛼, and standard deviation 𝜎𝑎
2 estimated from the data. The distribution 
has the effect of pulling the estimates of [𝛼𝑗
𝑁𝐴𝐼𝐶𝑆3] toward the mean 
level 𝜇𝛼, but not all the way…”46  
                                                     
46 Andrew Gelman and Jennifer Hill, 257. 
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Equation 2 Combined Industrial Concentration and Competition and Ceiling Breaches 
To avoid repetition, only the final combined equations for ceiling breach and 
termination are displayed here. The exclusively concentration and competition 
models follow the same pattern, but omit the other study variable(s) and relevant 
interactions. 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑒𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ (𝑦𝑖 = 1 )  







+  𝛽2𝑐𝑙_𝑑𝑒𝑓6_𝐻𝐻𝐼_𝑙𝑎𝑔1𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑂𝑓𝑓1 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑂𝑓𝑓2 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑂𝑓𝑓3-4𝑖
+  𝛽6𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑂𝑓𝑓5𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑐𝑙_𝑑𝑒𝑓3_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜_𝑙𝑎𝑔1𝑖 +  𝛽8𝑐𝑙_𝑑𝑒𝑓6_𝑜𝑏𝑙_𝑙𝑎𝑔1𝑖 
+  𝛽9𝑐𝑙_𝑑𝑒𝑓6_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜_𝑙𝑎𝑔1𝑖 +  𝛽10𝑐𝑙_𝑈𝑆6_𝑎𝑣𝑔_𝑠𝑎𝑙_𝑙𝑎𝑔1𝑖 + 𝛽11𝑐𝑙_𝐶𝑒𝑖𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽12𝑐𝑙_𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽13𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑉𝑖
+ 𝛽14𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑉𝑖 + 𝛽15𝐹𝑆𝑆-𝐺𝑊𝐴𝐶𝑖
+  𝛽16𝐵𝑃𝐴-BOA𝑖 + 
𝛽17𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟_𝐹𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽18𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽19𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏-𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽20𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟_𝐶𝐵𝑖  + 𝛽20𝑇𝑀-LH-FPLOE𝑖 + 𝛽20𝑏_𝑈𝐶𝐴𝑖  + 𝛽20𝑏_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑙𝑖
+  𝛽21𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑂𝑓𝑓1 ∙ 𝑏_𝑈𝐶𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽22𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑂𝑓𝑓2 ∙ 𝑏_𝑈𝐶𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽23𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑂𝑓𝑓3-4𝑖 ∙ 𝑏_𝑈𝐶𝐴𝑖
+  𝛽24𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑂𝑓𝑓5𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖 ∙ 𝑏_𝑈𝐶𝐴𝑖 +  𝛽25𝑐𝑙_𝑑𝑒𝑓6_𝐻𝐻𝐼_𝑙𝑎𝑔1𝑖 ∙ 𝑏_𝑈𝐶𝐴𝑖 +   𝛽26𝑐𝑙_𝐶𝑒𝑖𝑙𝑖 ∙ 𝑏_𝑈𝐶𝐴𝑖
+   𝛽27 cl_𝑑𝑒𝑓6_𝐻𝐻𝐼_𝑙𝑎𝑔1𝑖 ∙ 𝑐𝑙_𝑑𝑒𝑓6_𝑜𝑏𝑙_𝑙𝑎𝑔1𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖) ,          𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 1 𝑡𝑜 249,855 
𝛼𝑗
𝑁𝐴𝐼𝐶𝑆3~𝑁(𝜇𝛼,, 𝜎𝑎
2), 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗 = 1 𝑡𝑜 79 
𝛼𝑘
𝑁𝐴𝐼𝐶𝑆6~𝑁(𝜇𝛼,, 𝜎𝑎








2), 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑚 = 1 𝑡𝑜 1,296 
 
Equation 3 Combined Industrial Concentration and Competition and Terminations 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑦𝑖 = 1 )  







+  𝛽2𝑐𝑙_𝑑𝑒𝑓6_𝐻𝐻𝐼_𝑙𝑎𝑔1𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑂𝑓𝑓1 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑂𝑓𝑓2 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑂𝑓𝑓3-4𝑖
+  𝛽6𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑂𝑓𝑓5𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑐𝑙_𝑑𝑒𝑓3_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜_𝑙𝑎𝑔1𝑖 +  𝛽8𝑐𝑙_𝑑𝑒𝑓6_𝑜𝑏𝑙_𝑙𝑎𝑔1𝑖 
+  𝛽9𝑐𝑙_𝑑𝑒𝑓6_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜_𝑙𝑎𝑔1𝑖 +  𝛽10𝑐𝑙_𝑈𝑆6_𝑎𝑣𝑔_𝑠𝑎𝑙_𝑙𝑎𝑔1𝑖 + 𝛽11𝑐𝑙_𝐶𝑒𝑖𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽12𝑐𝑙_𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽13𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑉𝑖
+ 𝛽14𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑉𝑖 + 𝛽15𝐹𝑆𝑆-𝐺𝑊𝐴𝐶𝑖
+  𝛽16𝐵𝑃𝐴-BOA𝑖 + 
𝛽17𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟_𝐹𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽18𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽19𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏-𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽20𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟_𝐶𝐵𝑖  + 𝛽21𝑇𝑀-LH-FPLOE𝑖 + 𝛽22𝑏_𝑈𝐶𝐴𝑖  + 𝛽23𝑏_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑙𝑖
+  𝛽24𝑐𝑙_𝑑𝑒𝑓6_𝐻𝐻𝐼_𝑙𝑎𝑔1𝑖 ∙ 𝑏_𝑐𝑙_𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑖 +   𝛽25𝑐𝑙_𝑑𝑒𝑓6_𝐻𝐻𝐼_𝑙𝑎𝑔1𝑙𝑖 ∙ 𝑐𝑙_𝑑𝑒𝑓6_𝑜𝑏𝑙_𝑙𝑎𝑔1𝑖
+   𝛽26 cl_𝑑𝑒𝑓3_𝐻𝐻𝐼_𝑙𝑎𝑔1𝑖 ∙ 𝑐𝑙_𝑑𝑒𝑓3_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜_𝑙𝑎𝑔1𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖) ,          𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 1 𝑡𝑜 249,855 
𝛼𝑗
𝑁𝐴𝐼𝐶𝑆3~𝑁(𝜇𝛼,, 𝜎𝑎
2), 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗 = 1 𝑡𝑜 79 
𝛼𝑘
𝑁𝐴𝐼𝐶𝑆6~𝑁(𝜇𝛼,, 𝜎𝑎
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5 Results  
This section groups the models not by hypothesis but by outcome variable: 
number of offers, ceiling breaches, and terminations. This approach was chosen 
because models with the same outcome, such as ceiling breaches, are more similar 
than those with the same study variable, such as competition. The next section, 6
 Discussion, collects and analyzes these results across different outputs. When 
interpreting coefficients, section 4.2 is an important reference as all of the 
continuous variables in these models have been logged, centered around the logged 
mean, and rescaled such that a one unit change in the variable corresponds to a two 
standard deviation change in the log of the original input. This approach is used so 
that the magnitude of the coefficients of variables with different base scales can be 
more easily cross compared. Gelman and Hill specifically recommend dividing by 
twice the standard deviation so that the continuous variables may also be more 
easily compared with dummy variables that have not been recentered. 47 
5.1 Industrial Concentration’s Correlation with Competition  
This model examines the relationship between the number of offers a contract 
receives and two study input variables: the subsector industrial concentration and 
the detailed industry industrial concentration. The model, shown in Table 1, finds a 
significant negative relationship between concentration and competition but with a 
surprising low magnitude. In keeping with H2, sectors that are less concentrated are 
associated with more offers. The study finds a 1 unit increase in the subsector HHI is 
associated with a 5 percent of a unit increase in the number of offers received. For 
the detailed industry, the result is not significant and, contrary to H2, goes in the 
opposite direction and has only a fifth of the magnitude. 
This multilevel model includes varying intercepts that are not shown in the 
table: the who, what, and when of each contract and task order. The intraclass 
correlation coefficient calculates the influence of each grouping. The who intercepts 
                                                     
47 Andrew Gelman and Jennifer Hill, 55-57. 
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explain 25.7 percent of the model variance and is tracked by the contracting office 
(16.4 percent) and agency within the DoD (9.4 percent). The what intercepts explain 
another 11.3 percent of the variance between the subsector (1.9 percent) and 
NAICS detailed industry (9.4 percent). The when intercepts, which are only included 
in this model due to its minimal influence on performance measures, refers to the 
start year of the contract or task order and explains only 0.7 percent of the variance. 
The greater explanatory power of agency and office variables suggests that varying 
competitive approaches and vendors relationship with contracting offices may affect 
bidding behavior more than vendor industrial focus. 
From the economic sector variables, the most noteworthy estimator is the 
amount of defense obligations for the detailed industry, with a 1 unit increase in 
obligations within that detailed industry estimating an 8 percent of a unit increase in 
the rescaled number of offers. Contract vehicle has a minimal influence on number 
of offers (with the exception of BPA/BOAs, which correlate with 6 percent fewer 
offers than FFP). The initial scope of the contract is not a significant estimator.  
Contracts which incorporate some form of cost-based agreement correlate 
with 2 to 9 percent fewer offers than FFP. In the other direction, fixed- price 
contracts that are neither incentive nor firm-fixed-price estimate 21 percent more 
offers. The study team looked at the interaction of the average salary in a detailed 
industry and pricing mechanism, thinking that higher salaries might be associated 
with higher complexities and thus greater risk for FFP. However, the interaction with 
salary only magnified the above trends. The results for UCAs are more in line with 
expectation, as they estimate 9 percent fewer offers, and this phenomenon is 
slightly, but not significantly, amplified in detailed industries that are more 
concentrated.   
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Table 1. Regression Model of Log (Number of Offers) 
 
Concentration 
(Intercept) -0.11 (0.04)** 
Study Variables 
 
     Log(Subsector HHI) -0.05 (0.00)*** 
     Log(Det. Ind. HHI) 0.01 (0.00)· 
NAICS Characteristics 
 
     Log(Subsector Ratio) -0.00 (0.01) 
     Log(Det. Ind. Def. Obl.) 0.08 (0.01)*** 
     Log(Det. Ind. Ratio) -0.01 (0.00)*** 
     Log(Det. Ind. U.S. Avg. Salary) -0.02 (0.01)*** 
Contract Characteristics 
 
     Log(Init. Ceiling) 0.00 (0.00) 
     Log(Init. Days) 0.01 (0.00)*** 
     Vehicle=S-IDC -0.01 (0.00)*** 
     Vehicle=M-IDC -0.00 (0.01) 
     Vehicle=FSS/GWAC 0.00 (0.00) 
     Vehicle=BPA/BOA -0.06 (0.01)*** 
     Pricing=Other FP 0.21 (0.00)*** 
     Pricing=Incentive Fee -0.02 (0.01) 
     Pricing=Combination or Other -0.03 (0.01)* 
     Pricing=Other CB -0.05 (0.01)*** 
     Pricing=T&M/LH/FP:LoE -0.07 (0.01)*** 
     UCA -0.09 (0.01)*** 
     Performed Abroad -0.13 (0.01)*** 
Interactions 
 
     Log(Det. Ind. HHI):UCA -0.05 (0.02)· 
     Vehicle=S-IDC:Performed Abroad 0.12 (0.01)*** 
     Vehicle=M-IDC:Performed Abroad 0.06 (0.02)*** 
     Vehicle=FSS/GWAC:Performed Abroad 0.07 (0.02)*** 
     Vehicle=BPA/BOA:Performed Abroad 0.07 (0.02)*** 
     Pricing=Other FP:Log(Det. Ind. U.S. Avg. Salary) 0.51 (0.01)*** 
     Pricing=Incentive Fee:Log(Det. Ind. U.S. Avg. Salary) -0.07 (0.08) 
     Pricing=Comb./or Other:Log(Det. Ind. U.S. Avg. Salary) -0.10 (0.03)** 
     Pricing=Other CB:Log(Det. Ind. U.S. Avg. Salary) -0.26 (0.03)*** 
     Pricing=T&M/LH/FP:LoE:Log(Det. Ind. U.S. Avg. Salary) -0.36 (0.03)*** 
AIC 131551.64 
BIC 131927.07 
Log Likelihood -65739.82 
Num. obs. 249855 
Var: Office:Agency (Intercept) 0.03 
Var: NAICS:NAICS3 (Intercept) 0.01 
Var: NAICS3 (Intercept) 0.00 
Var: Agency (Intercept) 0.01 
Var: StartCY (Intercept) 0.00 
Var: Residual 0.10 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, ·p < 0.1. Logged inputs are rescaled. For this model, sole 
source contracts are treated as having 1 offer. 
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Also in line with expectations, contracts performed internationally are 
associated with a 13 percent of a unit reduction in offers. The model also bears out 
the idea that indefinite delivery vehicles are used to mitigate this trend, as single-
award IDCs almost entirely counter this penalty, and other vehicles cut it roughly in 
half, but all forms of indefinite delivery vehicles mitigate this trend 
5.2 Ceiling Breaches’ Correlation with Industrial Concentration and 
Competition  
Table 2 shows the models for ceiling breaches first using industrial 
concentration and competition as separate inputs, and then including them both in 
the same model. This approach was chosen because if competition was primarily a 
channel for industrial concentration, then we would expect the coefficients for the 
study variables to change markedly based on the inclusion of the other. This proved 
not to be the case, so for simplicity’s sake, the analysis will focus on the model that 
included both variables. 
The models show that, in keeping with H1, concentration significantly 
correlated with ceiling breaches at both the subsector and detailed industry level. 
Surprisingly, the directions of the estimated coefficients of these variables oppose 
one another. While interpreting the sign of the relationship is straightforward, 
interpreting the coefficient requires an addition step because the models for ceiling 
breach and terminations use logit models, which are well suited to the binary output 
measures chosen by the study team. To meaningfully interpret the results, it is 
necessary to transform them with an inverse logit function to provide an odds ratio. 
These results can be seen in Table 3 below. In interpreting these ratios, a value of 1 
would mean no relationship between the variable and ceiling breaches. The value of 
0.69 for log(Subsector HHI) indicates that one unit increase in the HHI would be 
associated with a 41 percent reduction in ceiling breaches. The value of 1.22 for 
log(Det. Ind HHI) would estimate a 21 percent increase in the prevalence of ceiling 
breaches. The 2.50% and 97.50% give the 95 percent confidence interval for the 
odds ratio. If the 95 percent confidence interval does not overlap with the 1, then the 
odds ratio is significant at the 0.05 level. These values were slightly different for the 
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model that included both competition and concentration, but retained approximate 
direction, magnitude, and significance. 
The subsector coefficient has a greater strength, but the interactions show 
that the detailed industry HHI might have more influence under the right 
circumstances. Namely, for detailed industries with more defense obligations, the 
interaction with the HHI is associated with a higher risk of ceiling breaches (odds 
ratio 1.30). This interaction was tested because one property of the HHI is that it 
tends to be higher for smaller sectors. This follows naturally from the means by 
which it is calculated.  
 






























Ceiling Breach Odds Ratios 
Odds 
Ratio 







Concentration Log(Subsector HHI) 0.68 0.56 0.83 
Concentration Log(Det. Ind. HHI) 1.21 1.03 1.42 
Competition Comp=1 offer 0.76 0.66 0.89 
Competition Comp=2 offers 0.98 0.84 1.13 
Competition Comp=3-4 offers 0.92 0.8 1.05 
Competition Comp=5+ offers 0.99 0.87 1.13 
Both Log(Subsector HHI) 0.69 0.57 0.83 
Both Log(Det. Ind. HHI) 1.22 1.04 1.44 
Both Comp=1 offer 0.76 0.66 0.89 
Both Comp=2 offers 0.98 0.84 1.13 
Both Comp=3-4 offers 0.92 0.8 1.04 
Both Comp=5+ offers 0.99 0.87 1.13 
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Table 3. Logit Models of Ceiling Breaches 
 
Concentration Competition Both 
(Intercept) -5.33 (0.27)*** -5.24 (0.27)*** -5.26 (0.27)*** 
Study Variables 
   
     Log(Subsector HHI) -0.38 (0.10)*** 
 
-0.38 (0.10)*** 
     Log(Det. Ind. HHI) 0.19 (0.08)* 
 
0.20 (0.08)* 
     Comp=1 offer 
 
-0.27 (0.08)*** -0.27 (0.08)*** 
     Comp=2 offers 
 
-0.02 (0.08) -0.02 (0.08) 
     Comp=3-4 offers 
 
-0.09 (0.07) -0.09 (0.07) 
     Comp=5+ offers 
 
-0.01 (0.07) -0.01 (0.07) 
NAICS Characteristics 
   
     Log(Subsector Ratio) -0.50 (0.20)* -0.49 (0.20)* -0.51 (0.20)* 
     Log(Det. Ind. Def. Obl.) 0.19 (0.09)* 0.20 (0.09)* 0.18 (0.09)* 
     Log(Det. Ind. Ratio) -0.02 (0.04) -0.02 (0.04) -0.02 (0.04) 
     Log(Det. Ind. U.S. Avg. Salary) -0.15 (0.07)* -0.16 (0.07)* -0.15 (0.07)* 
Contract Characteristics 
   
     Log(Init. Ceiling) 1.45 (0.07)*** 1.44 (0.07)*** 1.44 (0.07)*** 
     Log(Init. Days) 0.49 (0.07)*** 0.49 (0.07)*** 0.48 (0.07)*** 
     Vehicle=S-IDC -0.30 (0.06)*** -0.30 (0.06)*** -0.30 (0.06)*** 
     Vehicle=M-IDC 0.05 (0.08) 0.08 (0.08) 0.08 (0.08) 
     Vehicle=FSS/GWAC -0.17 (0.10)· -0.15 (0.10) -0.14 (0.10) 
     Vehicle=BPA/BOA -0.40 (0.14)** -0.42 (0.14)** -0.39 (0.14)** 
     Pricing=Other FP -0.15 (0.27) -0.17 (0.27) -0.15 (0.27) 
     Pricing=Incentive Fee 2.28 (0.30)*** 2.27 (0.30)*** 2.27 (0.30)*** 
     Pricing=Combination or Other 0.60 (0.21)** 0.60 (0.21)** 0.59 (0.21)** 
     Pricing=Other CB -0.10 (0.15) -0.09 (0.15) -0.09 (0.15) 
     Pricing=T&M/LH/FP:LoE -0.07 (0.23) -0.08 (0.23) -0.08 (0.23) 
     UCA 2.25 (0.20)*** 2.47 (0.22)*** 2.58 (0.23)*** 
     Performed Abroad -0.22 (0.12)· -0.18 (0.12) -0.19 (0.12)· 
Interactions 
   
     Log(Det. Ind. HHI):Log(Det. Ind. Def. Obl.) 0.25 (0.11)* 
 
0.26 (0.11)* 
     Log(Det. Ind. HHI):UCA 0.79 (0.29)** 
 
0.65 (0.31)* 
     Log(Init. Ceiling):UCA -2.12 (0.32)*** -1.87 (0.32)*** -1.95 (0.32)*** 
     Comp=1 offer:UCA 
 
-0.58 (0.43) -0.64 (0.43) 
     Comp=2 offers:UCA 
 
-2.28 (1.00)* -2.11 (0.99)* 
     Comp=3-4 offers:UCA 
 
-0.99 (0.46)* -0.91 (0.46)* 
     Comp=5+ offers:UCA 
 
-2.08 (0.74)** -1.96 (0.74)** 
AIC 18128.02 18121.48 18110.13 
BIC 18409.59 18444.77 18475.13 
Log Likelihood -9037.01 -9029.74 -9020.06 
Num. obs. 249855 249855 249855 
Var: Office:Agency (Intercept) 1.09 1.08 1.08 
Var: NAICS:NAICS3 (Intercept) 0.28 0.30 0.28 
Var: NAICS3 (Intercept) 0.24 0.25 0.25 
Var: Agency (Intercept) 0.65 0.65 0.65 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, ·p < 0.1. Logged inputs are rescaled. 
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For example, one would expect Raytheon to have a substantial share of the 
guided missile detailed industry, but when zooming out to the transportation 
manufacture subsector, it is only one of the big 5 defense contractors. Thus, the 
detailed industry HHI matters more in the detailed industries where the DoD buys a 
lot, like the aforementioned guided missiles, rather than those where it buys a little, 
such as any of the agriculture or mining sectors. This relationship is only significant 
at a p-value of 0.10, but the magnitude is sufficient to make it of interest. 
While H1 is upheld for ceiling breaches, albeit in both directions, the results 
are weaker for competition. H3 predicts that competition will be associated with better 
performance, and, indeed, the odds ratios for competition are below 1.0 regardless 
of the number of offers. However, this finding is only significant for competition with a 
single offer (odds ratio 0.76), and even were it significant for greater numbers of 
offers, the magnitude of the reduction would still be quite small. This is a surprising 
result because competition with only a single offer is typically not considered to be 
effective competition. One explanation might be that more offers increase the 
chance that one of the vendors is making a high-risk aggressive bid. Another 
possible explanation is that this metric only captures whether breaches occur, and 
not whether any money was saved by competition. Both of these concepts are 
explored in more detail in the Discussion section. 
This multilevel model includes varying intercepts for the who and what of the 
contract but not the start year. The intraclass correlation coefficient again shows that 
the organization doing the buying explains the most variance (31.1 percent) divided 
between agency (11.7 percent) and contracting office (19.5 percent). The NAICS 
category is less important than for estimating the number of offers, explaining only 
9.5 percent of variance. The division is fairly even between the subsector (4.4 
percent) and detailed industry (5.0 percent). The preponderance of influence 
suggests the unobserved contracting policy and instrument variation between 
different military departments, agencies, and offices lead to significant variation in 
how change orders are used and contract ceilings are set. 
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The economic variables were contrary to expectation in two cases. First, at 
the subsector level, those subsectors where DoD obligations had a higher ratio to 
overall U.S. revenue estimated less frequent ceiling breaches (odds ratio 0.69). This 
suggests that the DoD may not be achieving the potential risk reduction benefits of 
contracting in sectors where there is a larger commercial market available. Also 
surprising is that the higher U.S. average salaries in the detailed industry estimated 
a lower risk of ceiling breach (ratio 0.86). The study team uses that variable as a 
proxy for the unobserved skill requirements in that part of the economy, which in turn 
is a proxy for complexity. This suggests the limitations of average wage as a proxy. 
Since each detailed industry has its own intercept, the model may already be 
capturing unobserved complexity more effectively than the study team’s choice of 
variable. More in line with expectations is that detailed industries with more defense 
obligations run a greater risk of ceiling breaches (odds ratio 1.20). 
When examining contract characteristics, both higher logged initial contract 
ceilings and longer logged initial durations estimate higher risks of ceiling breaches 
(odds 4.21 and 1.62, respectively). This is in line with expectation, as larger scoped 
contracts are typically more complex and harder to predict, although the importance 
of ceiling over duration is noteworthy. In terms of contract vehicles, both single-
award IDCs and BPA/BOAs estimated lower risks of ceiling breaches, which may 
reflect an institutionalized partnership between government and industry. On the 
other hand, this includes both of the vehicles with single-award variants, and in this 
case, a contracting officer may find it easier to start a new task order than to issue a 
change order. 
The results on pricing mechanism included some results that were in line with 
expectation, but one troubling surprise. The result that ran directly contrary to 
expectations was that incentive fee contracts, which includes both fixed-price 
incentive fee and cost-plus incentive fee, estimated eightfold increase in risk of 
ceiling breaches (odds ratio of 9.64). This result is discussed in greater detail in 
section 6.3.  
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The other pricing results are in keeping with expectations. Combination and 
other contracts use unusual or mixed pricing approaches, which suggests 
complexity and may explain why they estimate a greater chance of ceiling breaches 
(1.81 odds ratio). Meanwhile, UCAs are associated with an order of magnitude 
increase in the rate of ceiling breaches (13.26 odds ratio). Interactions also estimate 
that multi-offer competition and less concentrated sectors both are associated with a 
lower risk of ceiling breach. Finally, and less intuitively, a larger ceiling size is 
associated with a lower risk of ceiling breach.  
5.3 Termination’s Correlation with Industrial Concentration and 
Competition  
The termination models lend weaker support for H1’s prediction that industrial 
concentration significantly correlates with contract performance. As with ceiling 
breaches, the three models (just concentration, just competition, and both) have 
roughly similar coefficient. So, for simplicity sake, the study team focused on the 
model incorporating both study variables. As shown in Table 4, a greater subsector 
HHI is associated with an increased risk of termination (odds ratio 1.28) which 
notably is the opposite direction as the relationship between subsector HHI and 
ceiling breaching. Also reversed is the coefficient for Det. Ind. HHI, but the 
relationship is not significant. Turning to interaction, as shown in Table 5, the 
subsector HHI’s estimation of increased risk of termination is further increased when 
the Subsector Ratio is high, which is to sway in those subsectors where the DoD 
obligations account for a significant portion of total U.S. revenues, although this 





















Terminations Odds Ratio 
Odds 
Ratio 
95 Percent Conf. 
Interval 





Concentration Log(Subsector HHI) 1.29 1.08 1.54 
Concentration Log(Det. Ind. HHI) 0.86 0.7 1.04 
Competition Comp=1 offer 1.21 1.05 1.41 
Competition Comp=2 offers 1.37 1.17 1.6 
Competition Comp=3-4 offers 1.48 1.28 1.72 
Competition Comp=5+ offers 2.24 1.95 2.57 
Both Log(Subsector HHI) 1.28 1.08 1.53 
Both Log(Det. Ind. HHI) 0.86 0.71 1.05 
Both Comp=1 offer 1.21 1.05 1.41 
Both Comp=2 offers 1.36 1.16 1.6 
Both Comp=3-4 offers 1.48 1.28 1.71 
Both Comp=5+ offers 2.23 1.94 2.56 
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Table 5. Logit Model Results for Terminations 
 
Concentration Competition Both 
(Intercept) -5.17 (0.15)*** -5.51 (0.13)*** -5.47 (0.13)*** 
Study Variables 
   
     Log(Subsector HHI) 0.25 (0.09)** 
 
0.25 (0.09)** 
     Log(Det. Ind. HHI) -0.15 (0.10) 
 
-0.15 (0.10) 
     Comp=1 offer 
 
0.19 (0.08)* 0.19 (0.08)* 
     Comp=2 offers 
 
0.31 (0.08)*** 0.31 (0.08)*** 
     Comp=3-4 offers 
 
0.40 (0.08)*** 0.39 (0.08)*** 
     Comp=5+ offers 
 
0.80 (0.07)*** 0.80 (0.07)*** 
NAICS Characteristics 
   
     Log(Subsector Ratio) 0.07 (0.12) 0.07 (0.12) 0.07 (0.12) 
     Log(Det. Ind. DoD Obl.) -0.03 (0.07) -0.07 (0.07) -0.03 (0.07) 
     Log(Det. Ind. Ratio) 0.00 (0.02) 0.00 (0.02) 0.00 (0.02) 
     Log(Det. Ind. U.S. Avg. Salary) -0.04 (0.05) -0.03 (0.06) -0.02 (0.05) 
Contract Characteristics 
   
     Log(Init. Ceiling) 0.43 (0.06)*** 0.41 (0.06)*** 0.42 (0.06)*** 
     Log(Init. Days) 1.21 (0.08)*** 1.18 (0.07)*** 1.22 (0.08)*** 
     Vehicle=S-IDC -0.54 (0.06)*** -0.58 (0.06)*** -0.57 (0.06)*** 
     Vehicle=M-IDC -0.57 (0.12)*** -0.62 (0.12)*** -0.61 (0.12)*** 
     Vehicle=FSS/GWAC -0.28 (0.10)** -0.32 (0.10)** -0.31 (0.10)** 
     Vehicle=BPA/BOA -0.72 (0.15)*** -0.67 (0.15)*** -0.71 (0.15)*** 
     Pricing=Other FP -0.84 (0.15)*** -0.81 (0.15)*** -0.82 (0.15)*** 
     Pricing=Incentive Fee -0.01 (0.43) 0.10 (0.43) 0.09 (0.43) 
     Pricing=Combination or Other -0.87 (0.48)· -0.84 (0.48)· -0.84 (0.48)· 
     Pricing=Other CB -0.47 (0.28)· -0.44 (0.28) -0.44 (0.28) 
     Pricing=T&M/LH/FP:LoE -0.15 (0.31) -0.11 (0.32) -0.11 (0.32) 
     UCA 0.63 (0.15)*** 0.77 (0.15)*** 0.78 (0.15)*** 
     Performed Abroad 0.39 (0.10)*** 0.42 (0.10)*** 0.43 (0.10)*** 
Interactions 
   
     Log(Det. Ind. HHI):Log(Init. Days) 0.13 (0.14) 
 
0.14 (0.14) 
     Log(Det. Ind. HHI):Log(Det. Ind. DoD Obl.) 0.18 (0.11) 
 
0.17 (0.11) 
     Log(Subsector HHI):Log(Subsector Ratio) 0.46 (0.24)· 
 
0.42 (0.24)· 
AIC 24037.30 23898.05 23891.98 
BIC 24318.87 24169.20 24215.27 
Log Likelihood -11991.65 -11923.03 -11914.99 
Num. obs. 249855 249855 249855 
Var: Office:Agency (Intercept) 0.72 0.75 0.73 
Var: NAICS:NAICS3 (Intercept) 0.10 0.11 0.10 
Var: NAICS3 (Intercept) 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Var: Agency (Intercept) 0.04 0.02 0.02 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, ·p < 0.1. Logged inputs are rescaled. 
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While the termination model lends mixed support for H1, it directly contracts 
H3'’s prediction that competition will be correlated with better performance. Instead, 
no matter the number of offers, competitive procedures estimated a higher risk of 
termination. Moreover, those categories with more offers had a greater risk, 
escalating from competition with a single offer (1.21 odds ratio), to competition with 
two offers (1.36 odds ratio), to competition with 3-4 offers (1.48 odds ratio), to the 
peak at competition with five or more offers (2.23 odds ratio). The study team 
believes that multiple distinct explanations may play a role in this phenomenon. First, 
as with ceiling breaches, competitions where there are likely to be multiple bidders 
may encourage bid-to-win strategies that sometimes prove to entail too much risk 
and may also, at times, indicate a failure to limit the field to qualified vendors. On the 
other hand, the government may be loath to resort to termination when there is no 
alternative vendor available. This explanation does little to explain the dramatic 
difference between competition with two offers and with five or more (odds ratios of 
1.36 and 2.24 respectively) but may help explain the difference between contracts 
that used competitive procedures and those that did not. Finally, bid-protests are 
one source of partial or complete terminations that are launched by losing vendors 
and thus are focused on competed contracts. 
For terminations, the multi-level portions of the model were still important but 
less important than they were for number of offers and ceiling breaches. The 
organization doing the contracting accounted for 17.8 percent of the model variance, 
according to the intraclass correlation coefficient, with only a small portion (0.5 
percent) captured at the agency level and the rest (17.3 percent) observed at the 
contracting office level. Similarly, the NAICS category was less influential and 
accounted for 4.0 percent of variance overall, with the subsector level (1.5 percent) 
being less influential than the detailed industry level (2.4 percent). The economic 
sector variables reached even 0.10 significance only in interaction with the study 
variables, as was mentioned above regarding the interaction of subsector ratio and 
subsector HHI. 
In contrast to the economic sector variables, contract scope is a powerful 
estimator of terminations. Reversing the observation for ceiling breaches, the log of 
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the initial duration is most strongly associated with a greater risk of termination (3.36 
odds ratio). That said, the log of initial contract ceiling still remains significant and is 
associated with a jump in terminations by more than a half in for every significant 
digit increase in ceiling size (odds ratio 1.52). Contract vehicle is also uniformly 
significant, with all indefinite vehicles predicting lower likelihood of termination. This 
is strongest for BPA/BOAs, multiple award IDCs, and single-award IDCs, with odds 
ratios of 0.49, 0.54, 0.57 respectively. Contributing factors to the correlation may be 
that experienced vendors, with a stronger relationship with the government, are 
more likely to use these vehicles. In addition, in some cases, contracting officers 
may be sufficient to address a problem by issuing no more task orders rather than 
needing to pursue outright terminations. The final vehicle category, FSS/GWACs, 
have a wider but prequalified vendor pool and still have a 0.74 odds ratio. 
Contract pricing has less estimating power, although “other fixed price,” a 
category made up of fixed price redetermination, fixed price award fee, and fixed 
price economic price adjustment, is associated with a greater than 50 percent 
reduction in the risk of termination (odds ratio 0.44). While the direction of this 
coefficient is not surprising, its magnitude is. In an interesting contrast to the ceiling 
breach results, combination and other pricing contracts estimate a lower rate of 
termination (odds ratio 0.43) despite being more likely to experience ceiling 
breaches, though only with at a p-value less than 0.10 level. The same is true for 
ceiling breaches, but only for the concentration model (it is not significant in the 
competition or both models). In keeping with ceiling breaches, UCAs estimate a 
significantly increased rate of termination (odds ratio 2.18), although the interactions 
with UCA did not prove significant and were left out of this model for reasons of 
parsimony. 
Finally, complicating the expectations that contracts with nowhere else to turn 
may be harder to terminate, those with an international place of performance are 
notably more likely to be terminated (odds ratio 1.53). This result would be 
consistent with the idea that these contracts are often in more challenging settings, 







6.1 Industrial Concentration 
While the strength of the correlation varies between metrics, this paper found 
firm support for the first hypothesis: 
 
 H1: industrial concentration leads to changes in contract performance  
 
The theoretical literature indicated that the effect on performance could go in 
both directions. Consolidated vendors may be better able to deliver economies of 
scale, efficiently integrate a range of different products and services, and make 
investments. On the other hand, greater concentration shifts the balance of power in 
the direction of the vendor and can ultimately risk putting the government in a 
monopoly situation where the government has fewer alternatives or is vendor locked 
with incumbents who lack the incentive to control costs. The models’ estimates were 
consistent with both of these possibilities, depending on the NAICS level under 
consideration and the output metric, as shown in Table 6. 
Table 6. Concentration Summary Table 













Ceiling Breaches Log(Subsector HHI) 0.69 0.57 0.83 -- 
Ceiling Breaches Log(Det. Ind. HHI) 1.22 1.04 1.44 Positive with Log(Det. Ind. Def. 
Obl.) and UCA. 
Terminations Log(Subsector HHI) 1.28 1.08 1.53 Weak positive (p-value <0.1) 
with Log(Subsector Ratio) 
Terminations Log(Det. Ind. HHI) 0.86 0.71 1.05 -- 
  
6.1.1 Subsector Industrial Concentration (NAICS 3-digit code) 
An increase in subsector HHI significantly correlates with less competition, 
with a lower rate of ceiling breach, and with a higher rate of termination. This 
incongruous combination might reflect that there are real economies of scale to be 
had in many subsectors of defense acquisition, but also that those sectors that are 
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more naturally monopolistic may face higher risk. Subsectors where the DoD is the 
largest buyer face an even greater risk of terminations. That said, the DoD’s 
interaction with subsector ratio has a high magnitude but is only significant at the p-
value<0.1 level. Thus, in broad terms, those subsectors that are highly concentrated 
and more defense-unique do face a greater risk of terminations, but not one that can 
be traced to challenges of executing within projected costs. 
One factor to keep in mind is that subsectors are notably larger and less 
concentrated than detailed industries. The logarithmic mean of HHI is below 500. A 
0.5 unit increase still leaves this metric below 1500 and thus in low concentration 
territory. This reflects the fact that only a small percentage of contractors fall in 
highly consolidated subsectors.  
6.1.2 Detailed Industry Industrial Concentration (NAICS 6-digit code) 
Detailed industry concentration is significantly associated with a higher risk of 
ceiling breaches, but a lower risk of terminations. However, in the latter case, the 
result is only significant with a p-value of 0.1. This combined result may still be 
consistent with a high detailed industry HHI both correlating with worse performance 
and also leaving the government vendor locked due to the absence of viable 
competitors. The risk of vendor lock is more plausible with detailed industry 
concentration, as the mean HHI value is over a thousand, and a change of one unit 
increases that value to over three thousand, well into the territory of a highly 
concentrated sector according to the DoJ standards. 
On the other hand, the contrast between subsector concentration and 
detailed industrial concentration as well as between different metrics at the same 
level might indicate the importance of choice of which level(s) of NAICS categories 
to include. In addition, the direction of this relationship should be read remembering 
that the model includes both subsector HHI and detailed industry HHI. The study 
team also experimented with a model that included only the detailed industry level, 
which had less explanatory value but was nonetheless significant. This robustness 
testing found that when only one HHI value was included, the results were closer to 
the subsector results than the detailed sector. This concern is mitigated by the 
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interaction between detailed industry defense obligations and industrial 
concentration.  
Taken together, the risk of ceiling breaches is estimated to be highest for 
contracts in NAICS category where the subsector HHI is low but the detailed 
industry has considerable defense obligations and a high HHI. This combination may 
may indicate that detailed industry consolidation has occurred despite the absence 
of a natural monopoly. The estimated risk of termination is highest for NAICS 
categories with above average subsector consolidation, a comparatively small 
commercial sector is, and a detailed industry where concentration is below average. 
The difference between the average value of the subsector HHI and the detailed 
industry HHI means that this could easily be true in those cases where there are few 
detailed industries to be found under a given subsector. The risk for both metrics is 
magnified when UCAs are present, but that issue is discussed in section 6.3. 
6.2 Competition 
The second and third hypotheses have a stricter requirement of support, as in 
each case they indicate the direction of the relationship: 
 H2: Increasing (decreasing) industrial concentration leads to decreasing 
(increasing)  competition  
 
 H3: Decreasing (increasing) competition makes poor contract performance 
more (less) likely  
 
The regression model estimating the number of offers, found support for H2, 
although the magnitude of the relationship was less than the study team expected. 
H3 found mixed support at best: only competition with a single offer significant 
estimated fewer ceiling breaches. In addition, all categories of competition are 
associated with a greater risk of terminations. Furthermore, those categories of 
competition with more offers, in ascending order, faced greater risk of terminations.  
6.2.1 Relationship between Industrial Concentration and Competition 
As was covered in results section 5.1, greater subsector industrial 
concentration does decrease the number of offers received, but the coefficient is 
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only -0.05, meaning a one unit change in subsector HHI only leads to a 5 percent 
decrease in number offers. Furthermore, the detailed industry HHI did not have a 
significant relationship to the number of offers received. This comparatively low 
magnitude suggests that a variety of factors (not included in the model) better 
explain much of the variance in number of offers. 
The first possible explanation is barriers to entry. This can be conceived as an 
outer wall, the challenges for commercial vendors seeking to enter the federal 
market, as well as an inner wall, the difficulty in establishing a relationship with any 
given agency or contracting office. The outer wall is by no means absolute. In those 
cases where there is less of a commercial sector available there also tend to be 
fewer offers, as measured by the detailed industry ratio of defense obligations to 
total U.S. revenue estimates. However, the magnitude of that coefficient is quite low, 
with the total size of the defense sector for that detailed industry being a more 
important estimator. The height of the inner wall is indicated by the high 
intercorrelated coefficients for the contracting agency and office. Even after 
accounting for a range of NAICS sector characteristics, agency and office account 
for over a quarter of the variation in the model (9.4 percent for agency and 16.4 
percent for office). This suggests that the market is often segmented by purchasers 
and not just by economic categories of vendors which suggests that government-
imposed barriers to entry may be as significant as economically structural dynamics. 
However, barriers to entry may not tell the whole story. More offers can be a 
means to an end but may be sacrificed to achieve other ends. Even in a detailed 
industry with many potential vendors, contracting officers may choose to prioritize 
speed or other goals rather than running up the score after they have achieved 
multiple offers. In fact, due to small business promotion efforts, contracting officers 
may limit competition to only small businesses if there are at least two viable 
contenders. On the other hand, agencies and contracting offices are evaluated 
based on the proportion of obligations awarded using competitive procedures, and 
percentage of competed obligations awarded after receiving multiple offers. Thus, 
even in concentrated detailed industries, contracting officers may choose to compete 
contracts and actively solicit vendor participation (even in consolidated sectors and 
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even if it takes more work to find competitors). Taken together, the model and this 
analysis suggest that industrial concentration is only one of many factors that 
influences the extent of competition. 
6.2.2 More offers May Not Be Better 
The findings in Table 7 do show that competition is associated with a lower 
chance of ceiling breaches, but that this is only significant for single offer competition 
(odds ratio 0.76). For terminations, the significant findings for all considered 
categories reject the hypothesis as formulated. The ceiling breach results do have 
limits to their robustness. Earlier versions of the models coded competition 
numerically with no competition coded as 0, single offer competition as 0.5, and 
multi-offer competition as 1. Under that definition, the ceiling breach model did not 
prove significant once the full suite of multilevel groupings was included. 
Table 7. Competition Summary Table 













Ceiling Breaches Both Comp=1 offer 0.76 0.66 0.89 -- 
Ceiling Breaches Both Comp=2 offers 0.98 0.84 1.13 Positive  
with 
UCA. 
Ceiling Breaches Both Comp=3-4 offers 0.92 0.8 1.04 
Ceiling Breaches Both Comp=5+ offers 0.99 0.87 1.13 
Terminations Both Comp=1 offer 1.21 1.05 1.41 -- 
Terminations Both Comp=2 offers 1.36 1.16 1.6 -- 
Terminations Both Comp=3-4 offers 1.48 1.28 1.71 -- 
Terminations Both Comp=5+ offers 2.23 1.94 2.56 -- 
As was raised in the results section, a straightforward interpretation of these 
results is that multi-offer competition may introduce mounting pressure for bids that 
will win the competition, even if they are not necessarily profitable for the vendor or 
may involve other risks. The more than doubling of risks for competition with 5+ also 
may suggest that outright unqualified bidders, who would need more than a change 
order to turn around their contract, may be more likely to win when there are many 
offers in play. 
55 
Another explanation that may explain why competition is associated across 
the board with a higher rate of terminations is that competition does presume that 
the government has another offer available. If they have no viable alternatives to 
turn to, the government may prefer means of sanction short of outright termination 
despite always having the option to terminate the contract of an underperforming 
vendor for convenience. This question may be better addressed by a research 
design that incorporates deobligations or other sanctions.48 If this explanation is 
correct, challenges would be more likely to lead to termination for competed 
contracts and those in less consolidated markets. 
In addition, the flip side of this bid-to-win explanation is that the government 
may still be receiving an important benefit from competition, just not one captured in 
the output variables used. Namely, if potential vendors bid more aggressively for 
multi-offer competition, then competed contracts should generally be less expensive 
than their sole source alternatives. Both ceiling breaches and terminations remain 
quite rare in the total universe of DoD contracts and task orders. As a result, if 
competition results in aggressive bids and lower prices, the DoD may still come out 
ahead from an expected value perspective. The ceiling breach and failure rate may 
be higher, but saving money on all contracts might be worth more than doubling a 
low baseline termination rate. Likewise, the possibility of another vendor stepping in 
does mitigate the downside of non-mission critical terminations. However, this 
calculation will vary from contracting office to contracting office and detailed industry 
to detailed industry. Aggressive bidding may be more damaging when the baseline 
risk of underperformance is higher. 
Altogether, these findings contradict the simple story that all good things, 
competitive procedures, more offers, and contract outcomes naturally go together. 
This does not mean that benefits cannot be seen. Single offer competition does 
correlate with a lower rate of ceiling breaches. This suggests that competitive 
                                                     
48 See for instance the doctoral dissertation Brunjes, B. (2016).  "Designing for Success:  Managerial Influence 
on Federal Contractor Performance."  PhD Dissertation, University of Georgia.   
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procedures may deliver some benefits even when only one vendor answers the 
solicitation. In addition, judging by the metrics in this study, there appears to be more 
risk as the number of offers increases. This also suggests that the DoD may be wise 
in being classifying anything with two or more offers as effective competition and 
giving even higher grades to competitions that exceed that standard. Contracting 
officers may already be acting on this insight, which may help explain why we do not 
see more offers in sectors with low consolidation as is discussed in section 6.2.1. 
6.3 Other Noteworthy Results 
UCAs have significant negative correlations with both terminations and ceiling 
breaches, justifying their classification as a high-risk contract type. Competition and 
detailed industry consolidation can both mitigate this association, although the 
relevant interactions were not significant in the termination model and thus were left 
out. The change order based metric used by this report may be especially sensitive 
to UCAs because any UCA that increases its cost ceiling when definitized will 
automatically be classified as having experienced a ceiling breach. Furthermore, 
cautious contracting officers may choose a deliberately low not to exceed value for 
UCAs until the details have been nailed down. Likewise, contracting officers may be 
more confident in setting a ceiling after reviewing proposals from multiple vendors. 
Contrary to expectations, incentive fee contracts were also found to be 
associated with much higher rates of ceiling breaches. This runs directly opposite 
the findings of the Performance of the Defense Acquisition System report, which 
employs financial reporting data that can directly observe overruns but are not 
available to the general public.49 This discrepancy may be partially explained by the 
differences between the overall contract dataset used by this study and the MDAP 
dataset used by that report, but the difference underlines the importance of the 
caveats discussed in Section 6.4.3. 
                                                     
49 Kendall, Frank, Performance of the Defense Acquisition System, 2014 (Washington, DC: U.S. 




6.4 Robustness and Limitations of the Research 
The study team has chosen to use reproducible methods to ease replication 
and also allow other researchers to build on our data in their own directions. The 
study team would also like to highlight those areas where research team decisions, 
and computational challenges, may have the greatest influence on the robustness of 
the results. 
6.4.1 The Multilevel Models Experienced Failure to Converge Warnings 
The study team has encountered persistent challenges with this warning, 
particularly when including detailed industry and contracting office groupings within 
the model. The creators of the regression and maximum likelihood tools that are 
used in this analysis have identified a likely culprit for this problem: 
“Exploratory analyses suggest that (1) the naive estimation of the 
Hessian may fail for large data sets (number of observations greater 
than approximately 1e5); (2) the magnitude of the scaled gradient 
increases with sample size, so that warnings will occur even for 
apparently well-behaved fits with large data sets.”50 
The study team was able to perform many of the recommended tests, and the 
resultant models matched the results of the models included in this paper. However, 
the study team was not able to complete tests on all seven models using the full 
range of available optimizers and encountered eigen value errors with some 
optimizers. 
6.4.2 Limitations of Performance Metrics 
Both ceiling breaches and terminations only look at specific aspects of 
contract and task order performance. The ceiling breach measure in particular does 
not test how the original or final cost ceiling compares to any should cost price, only 
whether the ceiling changed from the original. The source of the dataset, FPDS, 
does not include quantity information as a standalone field, and even if it were 
                                                     
50 “convergence: Assessing Convergence for Fitted Models” lme4: Linear Mixed-Effects Models using 
'Eigen' and S4. (R Package Documentation: 8/17/2018), 
https://rdrr.io/cran/lme4/man/convergence.html 
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available, the product or service code and NAICS categories combined are probably 
not specific enough to make apples-to-apples price comparisons. Likewise, the 
study team chose to use a binary measure of ceiling breach, which does not 
differentiate between large and small increases. As was aforementioned, the study 
team was driven by the rarity of ceiling breaches to make this choice. The logit 
model prioritizing understanding when ceiling breaches occur rather than estimating 
their magnitude. 
The termination measure is more robust, though it does include multiple 
forms of termination, both for convenience and default. In addition, partial and 
complete terminations are grouped within the FPDS data. As is noted earlier in the 
discussion section, the study may not capture badly performing contracts when the 
government does not have an alternative vendor available. 
6.4.3 Defining Sectors 
The direction of study variables does change depending on what NAICS 
levels are included in the multilevel model and which consolidation measures are 
used. The inputs ultimately included, subsector HHI and detailed industry HHI, do 
have a 0.57 correlation with each other but do not register as a problem when 
judging by the variance inflation factor. In robustness tests, the study team found 
that if only the detailed industry is included and the subsector HHI is more 
significant, then the direction of the detailed industry coefficient changes to match 
the removed subsector coefficient.  
Conceptually, sector definition is also a challenging issue as typically the 
more fine grained the sector definitions, the greater the consolidation. The study 
team has attempted to address this concern by including a range of economic sector 
metrics and also setting separate intercepts at both the subsector and detailed 
industry level. However, choosing the levels to include is a judgment call, and the 
team has tried to make the implication of our choices as clear as possible. 
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6.4.4 MDAPs and Incentive Fees 
Major Defense Acquisition Programs are the basis of much of the research on 
defense contracting. That data is subject to its own challenges and peculiarities, but, 
generally speaking, offers a bigger picture and higher fidelity view than the contract-
level perspective. That said, while MDAPs account for the largest defense projects, 
much of defense acquisition is not for development or is for smaller projects. The 
study team was not able to include a MDAP multilevel grouping in the dataset due to 
data quality challenges. This may strain the independence of observations 
assumptions that underlies statistical tests used in this paper because if one contract 
for a MDAP experiences challenges, delays may cascade to other contracts that are 
dependent upon it. Happily, the problem of interrelated contracts is mitigated by the 
inclusion of contracting offices, which capture some of the organization lines of 
responsibility. 
Relatedly, one of the largest anomalies found by the study was that incentive 
fee contracts estimated and extremely high risk of ceiling breaches. The termination 
models found no significant results for incentive fees, which suggests that this may 
be a peculiarity in the ceiling breach metric or a challenge encountered when 
incentive fee contracts are used outside the MDAP context where their benefits are 
better established. 
6.4.5 Missing data and Limitations of the Economic Census 
Thirty percent of contracts had to be excluded due to missing data, though 
this only excludes 18.7 percent of obligations. Some of these problems can be 
traced to FPDS reporting and also the recent switchover to a new USASpending.gov 
reporting system and some degradation in reporting in the final years of the old 
system. This was a particularly pertinent problem for undefinitized contract actions, 
which fell between the cracks when the column was renamed from letter contracts.  
On the economic statistics side, the biggest limitation is that many of the 
statistics used in this study, such as revenue, are only reported every five years. 
This means that the ratio variable used in this study has a lag of between 1 and 6 
years, depending on how far the contract start year is form 2007 and 2012. In 
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addition, the economic census does not include the NAICS public administration 
sector as well as an esoteric mix of non-government organization categories. 
Contracts in these categories have been excluded from the contract data 
calculations as well, including the calculation of subsector defense obligations. 
Finally, the definition of some NAICS categories shifted between 2007 and 
2012. Those subsectors and detailed industries whose codes were changed were 
treated as having missing data, with the one exception of code: 541710 Research 
and Development in the Physical, Engineering, and Life Sciences. That code had 
split into two, 541711 and 541712, which gave greater detail on biotechnology. 
There are tens of billions of dollars in these sectors, and to avoid losing them, the 
study team manually combined these codes, thus treating NAICS industry 54171 as 
if it were a detailed industry. 
6.4.6 Residuals for High Fitted Values 
The study team plotted binned residuals for the logit models to examine the 
discrepancy between estimated values and actual outcome. This approach sorts all 
of the data based on the fitted value, and then groups the data into some number of 
bins—50 for the purposes of this example. Each bin then calculates the average 
fitted value as well as the average outcome variable. Because the outcome variables 
for the logit models are binaries, their average value is equivalent to the percent of 
data in that bin for which the outcome, a ceiling breach or termination, occurs. These 
bins were then graphed using a scatter plot with the fitted average values on the x-
axis and the actual average on the y-axis. Across multiple models, there tended to 
be a single bin with the highest fitted values, typically in the 0.1 to 0.2 range. In the 
final model, this bin also reliably has a large negative residual, which is to say that 
the estimated value does identify some of the highest risk contracts, but even so, 
underestimates their risk. This suggests that there is some important input, perhaps 















Across the world, managing consolidation in the defense sector is a 
substantial challenge for both economic and industrial policy. Countries with 
comparatively smaller or less developed industrial bases often seek to promote 
consolidation, hoping national champion firms will gain the economics of scale to 
compete internationally. Even the United States, the global leader in defense 
spending, whose primary market is its own military, encouraged consolidation during 
the post-Cold War drawdown in the 1990s, a policy that was shared with the defense 
industry at what is evocatively referred to as ”The Last Supper.” 
Conversely, in the United States, Congress and the Executive branch, in 
statue, regulation, and policy, have put substantial emphasis on the importance of 
competition. Likewise, scrutiny is applied to mergers and acquisitions in the defense 
sector, and small business promotion policies seek to avoid excessive reliance on a 
small number of large companies.  
 Concentration Matters but the Effects Depend on How You Define 
Sectors 
The study’s results reflect the contradictions surrounding consolidations. 
Industrial concentration matters, is associated with a higher rate of termination at the 
subsector level, and, depending on the circumstance, is significantly associated with 
changes in the rate of ceiling breaches in both directions. This complexity also 
shows the wisdom in approaches like the sector-by-sector tier-by-tier review under 
DoD’s Better Buying Power Initiative and the current Administration’s industrial base 
review, which attempt to go deep in understanding the challenges of each sector 
rather than only looking to top-level aggregate scores.  
 Competition Strategies Should Account for Aggressive Bidding 
 Single Offer Competition May Still Deliver Value 
The strong association between contracts that received more offers and a 
higher estimated rate of termination suggests that while having more competing 
vendors may bring lower base prices, it may also correlate with a greater risk of 
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failure. Likewise, single-offer competition is associated with a lower rate of ceiling 
breaches than sole source awards, but multioffer competition does not significantly 
correlate with a lower rate. This does not mean that competition does not save 
money overall. This study does not have the metrics to examine whether competed 
contracts cost less than their sole-source alternative. However, when devising 
competition strategies, DoD should consider variation in risk tolerance and inherent 
risk from office to office and sector to sector. Further study is also warranted as to 
how approaches to competition and set asides can mitigate or aggravate these risks. 
 Vendor Bases Appear to be Strongly Segmented Down to the 
Contracting Office Level 
 Industrial Concentration and the Size of the Commercial Market 
Significantly but Weakly Predict the Number of Offers 
 Larger Commercial Markets Do Not Correlate With Lower Rates of 
Ceiling Breaches, but are Associated with Lower Termination Rate in 
Concentrated Markets 
While this study was not primarily focused on the challenges and benefits of 
commercial acquisition for the DoD, a variety of findings from the model have 
implications for those studying these issues. First, the study allowed for each 
detailed industry and contracting office to have its own intercept, and this revealed 
that for estimating purposes, who is doing the buying trumps the structure of the 
industry of the product or service being acquired. No small part of this is likely 
attributable to unobserved differences in contracting approaches and mission, but 
nonetheless, this finding suggests that market segmentation and barriers to entry 
are not just a matter of commercial suppliers versus defense suppliers, but also can 
draw dividing lines between contracting offices. 
On that same note, the significant explanatory power of contract vehicles (and 
their varying situational relevance) suggests that the choice of vehicles should 
perhaps be given additional attention as a factor that influences contract outcomes. 
As ever, these findings reinforce the judgment and human capital needed for 
successful acquisition policy and the absence of one-size fits all solutions—even for 
foundational strategies such as competition. 
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 Contracting Officer Judgment Matters and Could be Supplemented 
by Better Awareness of How Their Area of Responsible Compares to 
Other Parts of the DoD 
As the discussion and conclusion of this paper indicate, that even for 
competition, a touchstone and watchword of federal acquisition practice, context and 
tradeoffs matter. This study’s dataset reflects the best judgment choices of 
contracting officers, rather than random application of contract and competition 
strategies, and does not offer easy defense-wide answers. However, contracting 
officers could benefit from knowing what the estimated ceiling breach and 
termination rates are for their organization and relevant market segment. In low-risk 
and risk-tolerant sectors, pursuing competition more aggressively may bring savings 
with a manageable downside. In higher risk sectors, better estimating and 
investigating of vendor qualification may reduce the chances of later terminations. 
 Current Understanding of Competition in Defense Acquisition, and 
More Generally Under Monosopy, is Undertheorized and We Offer 
Our Contract and Task Order Dataset and Economic Sector Datasets 
to those Seeking Both Broad Overviews and Deep Dives 
Many of the issues of concern to defense acquisition officials are also on the 
minds of many of those studying the economy writ large, with its superstar firms that 
are sizeable enough to develop their own industrial bases.51 In particular, this study 
would be well complemented by deep dives into individual sectors that do not face 
some of the same limitations of DoD-wide research.52  
  
                                                     
51 Neil Irwin, “The Upshot: Are Superstar Firms and Amazon Effects Reshaping the Economy?” New 
York Times (New York, August 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/25/upshot/big-
corporations-influence-economy-central-bank.html 
52 We encourage any researchers and officials interested in the underlying data to reach out to 
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Appendix: Model Diagnostics 
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